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CONTEXT: Insider threats are among the most serious security concerns for organizations 
because of their catastrophic consequences on the organization's revenues and reputation. 
Several approaches have been proposed to detect the insider threats and mitigate their risk. 
However, discovering such attacks is a very challenging task because of the difficulty of 
distinguishing between the normal and the malicious activities conducted by trusted users. 
Insider threats are committed by people with enhanced knowledge about the organization's 
security mechanisms, such as employees and trusted partners who have authorized access 
to the digital systems. 
OBJECTIVES: The primary objective of this study is to detect the insider attacks before 
it causes catastrophic damage to the organization system. Furthermore, providing a data 
set of bio-signals that collected during real insider threats to develop and extend the 
research in this area.  
METHODS: We propose an approach that utilizes a combination of the human brain 
activities and the electrocardiogram (ECG) to identify the malicious acts of a trusted 
employee. The approach compares the normal and malicious patterns of the human bio-
signals to recognize the insider threats. The experimental scenarios for collecting the brain 
activities and ECG signals were carefully designed based on physiological considerations, 
xviii 
 
without affecting the participants' decision to commit the attacks. The wearable devices 
were utilized to collect the bio-signals because of their benefits such as being small, easy 
to connect to a computer, comfortable, and cheap. 
RESULTS: Eighty-four participants were included in this study. The achieved results 
illustrate that the proposed approach can detect the malicious threats with an average 
accuracy up to 98.4%. The results were evaluated further using several metrics to achieve 
high credibility and great confidence. In addition, this research provides a data set of the 
bio-signals collected from a wide range of participants for further research in this area. 
CONCLUSION: The proposed approach can accurately identify the malicious activities 
even if the amount of the incoming data is too small. Thus, it will help organizations to 
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التهديدات الداخلية من بين أكثر المخاوف األمنية خطورة للمنظمات بسبب عواقبها الكارثية على  تعتبر
التخفيف من ف عن التهديدات الداخلية والعديد من األساليب للكشقترحت وقد ا   إيرادات المنظمة وسمعتها.
للغاية بسبب صعوبة التمييز بين األنشطة  معقدةمهمة يعتبر ، فإن اكتشاف هذه الهجمات ومع ذلكخطورتها. 
يتم تنفيذ التهديدات الداخلية من حيث  العادية والنشاطات الضارة التي يقوم بها المستخدمون الموثوقون.
، مثل الموظفين والشركاء الموثوق بهم الذين حول آليات أمان المؤسسة جيدةأشخاص لديهم معرفة قبل 
الدراسة للكشف عن الهجمات الداخلية قبل  هذهتهدف  .للمؤسسة لديهم حق الوصول إلى األنظمة الرقمية
 هذا المجال نطاق البحث فيإثراء وتطوير  أن تتسبب في أضرار كارثية للمؤسسات. وعالوة على ذلك،
ولتحقيق  توفير قاعدة بيانات من اإلشارات الحيوية التي تم جمعها خالل تهديدات داخلية حقيقية. من خالل
وتخطيط القلب ( EEG)هذه االهداف تقترح هذه الدراسة نهًجا يستخدم مزيًجا من أنشطة الدماغ البشري 
(ECGالنهج المقترح بين األنماط الطبيعية والخبيثة يقارن . ( لتحديد األعمال الخبيثة لموظف موثوق به
للحصول على اإلشارات الحيوية المستخدمة . لإلشارات الحيوية البشرية للتعرف على التهديدات الداخلية
، عنايةتم تصميم السيناريوهات التجريبية لتجميع أنشطة الدماغ وإشارات تخطيط القلب بفي هذه الدراسة 
تم الهجمات الداخلية.  دون التأثير على قرار المشاركين بارتكابو فيزيولوجية،العتبارات اال مع مراعاة
يرة وسهلة التوصيل استخدام األجهزة القابلة لالرتداء لجمع اإلشارات الحيوية بسبب فوائدها مثل كونها صغ
تائج النتوضح وتشمل هذه الدراسة مشاركة أربعة وثمانون متطوعا.  ، ورخيصة.بجهاز كمبيوتر، مريحة
تم  ٪.98.4اكتشاف التهديدات الخبيثة بمتوسط دقة يصل إلى  ايمكنه ةالمقترح الطريقةالتي تم تحقيقها أن 
 تقييم النتائج بشكل أكبر باستخدام عدة مقاييس لتحقيق مصداقية عالية وثقة كبيرة.اختبار النهج المقترح و
 ممات الواردة صغيًرا جدًا. إذا كان حجم البياناحتى عالية يمكن للنهج المقترح تحديد األنشطة الضارة بدقة 




1 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Currently, information is the new world currency: money has value and so too does 
information. Multinational corporations, financial institutions, military organizations, and 
even small companies go to great lengths to protect their privacy and security from attacks. 
When a single computer is compromised in the organization, all other computers are 
vulnerable to attack [1]. Although traditional security methods are commonly used to 
protect computers and networks from attacks or unauthorized intrusions, these standard 
methods cannot prevent modern sophisticated insider attacks or initiate alerts to malicious 
insider activity. Several solutions have been developed for protecting organizations from 
outsider attacks. Among these solutions are data encryption, intrusion detection and 
prevention systems (IDS/IPS), and firewalls [2, 3]. However, attacks do not just come from 
outside; most of the harmful attacks occur from inside the organization, where the trusted 
employees can compromise the organization’s security. 
Insider attacks or insider threats become a significant security concern to organizations 
since differentiating between these crimes and non-malicious activities is difficult. Insider 
threats are committed by insiders who have more knowledge than outsiders do about the 
organization’s system and its security mechanisms [4]. There are two categories of insider 
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attacks: the first category occurs when insiders accidentally or without malicious intent 
cause harm to the organization’s security, whereas second-category insider attacks are 
malicious and happen when insiders use their privileges intentionally to attack the 
organization’s security [5]. 
The scope of this research is to protect organizations from the second category of insider 
threats. This research aims to reduce the risk of intentional insider attacks by utilizing bio-
signals associated with human behavior in addition to machine-learning classifiers. This 
research includes conducting experimental scenarios on a segment of volunteers to 
discriminate between malicious and normal activities by distinguishing their bio-signals. 
1.2 Problem Statement and Motivation 
When most people think of attacks, they picture criminals and hackers trying to break into 
a network from outside the organization. However, they do not realize that some of the 
biggest threats are already inside. Insiders are employees and trusted partners with 
authorized access to digital systems and information. A recent survey on insider threats 
conducted by SpectorSoft on 355 IT professionals reveals that almost all organizations 
have experienced at least one insider attack; moreover, around 75% of all insider crimes 
are undetected. The survey goes further, describing the state of internal attacks as unlikely 
to improve soon, and pointed out that the total losses of organizations amounted to around 
$2.9 trillion globally per year as a result of employee fraud, while the US losses amounted 
to around $40 billion because of such insider fraud [6]. 
Insider attacks have become a significant security concern to financial institutions, 
organizations, and small companies. Several incidents of insider attacks targeting 
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governments, organizations, and even universities [7, 8] have been reported. The trusted 
nature of the insider access means that data breaches are largely undetectable by standard 
cybersecurity measures such as antivirus programs, firewall filtering, blocking systems, 
and disk encryption. 
Insider attacks cause extensive damage to organizations. Thinking about the added cost of 
the data breach is even more disconcerting and brings a bigger financial burden to an 
organization. The added costs come from a variety of sources, not just the financial loss of 
that information but also responding to that incident, fixing all damages, and installing 
preventative systems. Moreover, there are numerous tangible costs such as the loss of 
customer loyalty. Therefore, governments and organizations invest money and enact laws 
to reduce the impact of such attacks. 
Currently, several solutions have been used by organizations to mitigate the risk of insider 
attacks, such as monitoring employees’ behaviors or applying signature-based solutions. 
Monitoring employees’ behaviors (i.e., anger or revenge) is based on human experience to 
distinguish such behaviors [9]. Thus, this solution does not provide accurate results, and 
the organization could be deceived since human behaviors, which are bound to emotions, 
are not very clear and are difficult to reveal. in Greitzer’s model [9] or verbal behavior [10] 
to recognize a potential risk could be deceived by individuals. On the other hand, signature-
based solutions allow organizations to act against the insider attack—but after the incident 
[11]. When the incident occurs, organizations attempt to identify the signatures of insider 
attacks and develop a mechanism or policy to prevent the reoccurrence of this incident. 
This solution can protect organizations from the same attacks only and does not provide 
impregnable protection against different mechanisms of insider attacks. A new insider 
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attack could seriously damage the organization’s data and cost them substantial financial 
losses as the rapid development of technology supports attackers to develop new and 
sophisticated methods of insider attacks. 
Therefore, different and new solutions to insider attacks are urgently needed. The ongoing 
optimal solution for addressing the insider threat issue requires new tools and new thinking. 
Being able to detect an insider attack before it causes catastrophic losses is far better than 
being attacked and then building a defense system using policies and signatures to prevent 
similar incidents from happening again. So, the insider attack detection system must be 
based on fixed measures present in each attacker. No matter how different the techniques 
used by the attacker, these measurements remain constant as the attacker cannot control 
them. In this research, we target human physiological involuntary signals to distinguish 
between the employee’s normal and suspicious activities, thus detecting insider attacks. 
Physiological signals are spontaneous patterns that give indications of emotions and bad 
intentions [12]. Therefore, the difference between the physiological patterns of normal and 
suspicious acts would well indicate insider threats without human intervention or even 
knowledge of the attack mechanism. The reasons that prompted us to utilize human 
physiology in detecting insider attacks are as follows: 
1.2.1 The Ability of Physiological Signals to Identify Human Moods and 
Intentions 
Human physiological signals are spontaneous signals—i.e., signals done without will or 
self-control. Therefore, imitating these signals is extremely difficult. Physiological signals 
occur inside the human body and nervous system, where these processes are measured to 
assess bodily functions. Physiological signals are constantly changing in response to 
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changes in the outer environment of the human body and also in response to human 
emotions and thoughts. Physiological signals such as blood pressure, heart rate, 
temperature, and brain signals change themselves to find the optimal balance to human 
physiological states based on feedback from the human body’s built-in sensors [12, 13]. 
Human behaviors are usually accompanied by feelings and psychological changes such as 
anger, stress, and fear. Many researchers are keenly interested in studying the relationship 
between human behaviors and nervous system feedback. The process of monitoring bio-
signals and neuro-signals is called biofeedback or neurofeedback, which enables us to 
associate physiological signals with human feelings and behaviors. 
Moreover, biofeedback and neurofeedback have been used by researchers in several 
systems such as emotion recognition, intention detection [14], cryptographic systems 
(cryptographic key) [15], detecting read book genres [16], control systems, and crime 
detection systems such as a polygraph or lie detector [17]. 
1.2.2 Ease of Physiological Data Collection and Analyzing 
Human bodies radiate data loudly, continuously, and individually. Typically, clinics and 
hospitals have the appropriate equipment to listen to that data, and these devices are 
expensive, large, and difficult to use. However, with the advent of wearable sensors, we 
now deal with gadgets and trackers that can collect physiological data and allow us to 
analyze these data in real time. 
Wearable sensors are small devices of varying shapes that fit on different locations on the 
body. These sensors can collect several types of human data, such as brain waves through 
electroencephalography (EEG), heart rate through electrocardiography (ECG), body 
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temperature, and skin conductance. These devices can be easily connected to the computer 
or to the smartphone to transfer the collected data. Moreover, the ease of use and low costs 
led to the widespread use of these devices [18, 19]. 
Physiological readings resulting from wearable sensors have become very important for 
individual health care. Several people have these devices. Recently, some third-party 
companies have increased the importance of collecting data via wearable sensors to the 
employers because these data could eventually affect the health insurance payments of their 
employees. Wearable sensors could be utilized by companies that want to lower their 
health-care bills. Some companies like Fitbit have begun selling their devices in bulk to 
employers; for instance, Autodesk sells discounted Fitbit devices to their employees, with 
the idea to encourage healthier behavior and a happier workforce [20]. 
We are motivated by all these features of modern techniques in measuring and collecting 
human physiological signals, which would give quick and accurate measurements of 
biofeedback and neurofeedback of the human body. Moreover, these devices have already 
been used in some companies [20], which increases the acceptance of using these devices 
to determine insider attacks. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
To mitigate the catastrophic influences of insider attacks by providing a solution to detect 
such threats, we have developed the following main research objective and a set of 
objectives that seek to achieve it. 
7 
 
Main Objective: To explore and study the potential of using physiological signals to detect 
insider attacks. 
The potential of using physiological signals to detect insider attacks is investigated by 
determining the ability of these signals to differentiate between normal and suspicious 
activities. To address the main objective challenge, we support the research with the 
following objectives: 
Objective 1: To conduct a survey of the existing insider threat detection approaches. 
This objective promotes research through knowledge regarding previous approaches, 
which will give a clear idea of the previous systems that were used to detect insider threats. 
The objective supports the further verification of the quality of the proposed system. 
Objective 2: To create a data set of physiological signals and make this data set available 
for further research. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no available data set containing human physiological 
signals that were collected during suspicious and normal acts. Therefore, objective 2 is 
essential for achieving the main objective because the existence of such a data set supports 
the ability to conduct research experiments on the proposed system. In addition, the 
availability of the data set for research use would provide an opportunity to develop and 
extend the research in this area. The data set would contain human physiological signals 
that were collected during normal and malicious activities. 
Objective 3: To characterize changes in some physiological activities that might lead to 
the detection of insider malicious activities. 
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If the physiological signals provide certified results in the determination of insider attacks, 
certainly not all physiological signals are equal in the determination of such attacks. 
Therefore, highlighting signals that play a significant role in identifying internal violations 
as well as clarifying the changes in these signals will be directed at improving the proposed 
system’s mechanism for detecting attacks. 
Objective 4: To propose and design a continuous monitoring system that might help in 
the detection of insider threats. 
This objective provides the design of the proposed system for combatting insider attacks. 
The main research objective will be taken into consideration as the design of the proposed 
system will depend on the human physiological signals collected but not on the monitoring 
of user actions in the network (for instance, the monitoring of the user’s log files). 
Objective 5: To evaluate the potential of using the proposed system for detecting insider 
attacks using physiological activities. 
Objective 5 explores the potential of using the proposed approach to reduce the damage of 
internal attacks by identifying these attacks using human physiological signals. This 
objective will assess the effectiveness of the proposed approach in distinguishing between 
the physiological signals of humans during normal and suspicious activities. Furthermore, 
this objective will clarify the ease and possibility of using the proposed system by 
organizations to act as a line of defense against insider attacks. 
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1.4 Research Questions 
To fulfill the above research objectives and to provide a feasible solution for detecting 
insider attacks, we have addressed the following research questions: 
1) What is the potential of using physiological signals to detect insider attacks? 
The first research question investigates the ability to use human involuntary signals to 
detect insider threats. This research question raises other inquiries such as what 
physiological signals should be available to conduct this research and, in case no data set 
that contains such signals is available, how experiments should be conducted to collect 
such signals. 
2) What are the experimental scenarios that will be followed for collecting data and 
building the signal database? 
To the best of our knowledge, no available data set contains physiological signals collected 
during normal and suspicious activities. So, the signals should be collected from volunteers 
during different experiments. RQ2 explores how to collect signals and what possible 
experimental scenarios will be used to assemble these signals. 
3) Which physiological signals are most important in detecting insider attacks from the 
selected signals in the experiments? 
RQ3 investigates whether all signals have an equal ability to identify internal attacks—in 
other words, whether all the signals collected during the experiments would be used in the 
proposed approach. Moreover, this research question determines the format of the signals 
that would help increase the accuracy of detecting insider threats and inspects the 
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relationship between changes in the collected signals and the identification of malicious 
activities. 
4) How can a practically robust monitoring system for the identification of insider attacks 
be designed? 
This research question investigates a critical point in the proposed system for detecting the 
insider threats: how the system should be designed. The design of the proposed system 
should determine the format of input signals and the output results that will clearly indicate 
insider attacks. 
5) Is the monitoring system practically robust in terms of identifying insider attacks? 
RQ5 investigates the quality of the proposed system for detecting insider attacks and 
discusses how the proposed system will be evaluated as well as what criteria are used for 
evaluation and how accurate the system is. 
1.5 Summary of Research Contribution 
Conducting an insider attack is risky and, in many cases, has catastrophic consequences on 
an organization’s security as well as its financial resources. To address the vulnerability of 
malicious insider threats, this research tackles the potential of using human physiological 
signals to detect such insider attacks. In particular, this work reports the design of a new 
approach that based on extracting a new set of features from biofeedback and 
neurofeedback. Instead of monitoring human-controlled behaviors, we emphasize on 
monitoring hard-to-imitate human involuntary signals. In the proposed approach, we utilize 
electroencephalography (EEG) and electrocardiography (ECG) data of the human body to 
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distinguish between the malicious and normal activities conducted by employees. The 
proposed approach converts the collected EEG and ECG signals into features to increase 
the efficiency of these signals to detect insider attacks, and the extracted features showed 
promising results. 
Additionally, the proposed approach was built on the identity theory, which states that 
trusting a user’s identity is one of the main weaknesses of the system and could leave a 
system vulnerable to insider attacks [21]. The proposed system does not rely on the user’s 
identity, but it acts as a line of defense against the authorized user’s attacks. Thus, the 
authorized user may be prevented from using the system if he or she is suspected of 
performing malicious activities. 
The proposed set of features is automatic and does not rely on human intervention or human 
experience to detect insider threats and utilizes machine learning to classify the malicious 
activities. Machine learning is a field of artificial intelligence that seeks to create predictive 
models and algorithms, giving computers the ability to build enough experience to carry 
out tasks without being explicitly programmed [22, 23]. 
The overall evaluation of results shows that the extracted features from EEG and ECG 
signals can correctly distinguish between a user’s malicious and benign activities. The 
results also ensured that the proposed approach would produce accurate results despite the 
period difference between normal and suspicious activities. In other words, the proposed 
approach detects an insider attack using a small period of malicious activities conducted 
by the attacker; thus, the proposed approach can detect the insider attack before any serious 
damage is done to the organization. 
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This research provides a data set that contains the physiological signals for 84 volunteers. 
Experiments were conducted to collect the physiological signals of the volunteers during 
their normal and suspicious processes. The proposed experimental scenarios for collecting 
data simulate as much as possible real-life insider attacks. 
Our research can help mitigate the risk of insider attacks targeting organizations. 
Regardless of the insider attack mechanisms, the proposed system helps address such 
insider threats. This will help organizations protect their privacy and provide security 
against attacks. In addition, the human physiological data set collected during normal and 
malicious activities for research use would provide an opportunity to develop and extend 
the research in this area. 
1.6 Thesis Roadmap 
The remaining chapters of this thesis are organized as follows. The glimpse of the research 
background is presented in chapter 2. Chapter 3 surveys the related work of insider attacks. 
Chapter 4 describes the research methodology, where the research challenges are 
addressed, and the proposed approach is discussed. Chapter 5 describes the experimental 
scenarios for collecting data and presents the experimental devices. It also discusses the 
data set creation and characterizes the process of extracted features from the collected 
signals. Chapter 6 introduces the evaluation criteria and presents and discusses the 
experimental results. It also highlights the evaluation of the proposed approach using 




Information has substantial value for large organizations or even small companies. Chapter 
one presents an overview of the importance of information security for organizations and 
illustrates the risk of insider attacks over those that occur from outside the organization. 
Moreover, this chapter describes the two categories of insider attacks, namely, accidental 
and malicious. It also defines the scope of this research, which tackles the second category 
of insider threats. 
The research problem, which is detecting insider threats by utilizing human bio-signals, is 
presented. To detect insider attackers, normal and malicious activities must be 
distinguished first. To address this problem, the main objective of this research is divided 
into five supporting objectives. These five objectives are integrated to solve the research 
problem. To fulfill the research objectives, five research questions are developed and 
discussed in this chapter. 
Furthermore, the research motivation is presented and divided into two main parts, namely, 
utilizing the advantage of human bio-signals’ ability to identify the human mood that may 
help to distinguish malicious activities and utilizing the advantage of modern technologies 
in capturing and analyzing human bio-signals. Moreover, the research contribution, which 
aimed at mitigating the risk of insider attacks that target organizations, is discussed. 





2 CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
2.1 Cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity has been known by several names, such as data security, IT security, and 
computer security. Regardless of the definition, the information stored on computers is 
almost always worth more than the computers themselves. Cybersecurity is the protection 
of computer systems, programs, networks, and data from undesirable behaviors of attackers 
under different circumstances and is an important issue for organizations because damaged 
security systems may cost significant financial losses. The organization’s security requires 
constant development to provide protection from several modern attacks [24].  
The scope of cybersecurity is wide, growing, and constantly changing as a result of the 
development of new attack methods. Generally, cybersecurity aims at protecting 
organizations’ invaluable data, such as assets where the organizations’ information security 
efforts should be focused. These assets can be divided into three types: data, software, and 
hardware assets. Data assets have the greatest value over other assets and include but are 
not limited to databases, the organization’s files, and the information that the organization 
generates daily, whereas software assets include mobile applications, programs, and 
operating systems. On the other hand, hardware assets include computers, communication 
channels, networks, and mobile devices that belong to the organization’s employees [25]. 
Cybersecurity can be divided into the following domains: 
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2.1.1 Access Control 
Controlling the access to the organization's assets or protecting the organization's resources 
from unauthorized disclosure is one of the important cybersecurity domains. Access 
control is the process of rejecting or accepting a specific request to enter physical facilities 
and/or using information services. Sometimes, there is a confusion between the term access 
with the authorization and authentication. Access is the ability to reach, read and modify 
the resources. On the other hand, the authorization is the rights and permissions to use the 
resources, whereas the authentication is the process of identifying and proving the user 
who he claims to be, using different methods such as username and password [26]. 
2.1.2 Software Development Security 
Software Development Security is the process of embedding the principles of software 
security through the software development life-cycle. As the best practices of software 
development, embedding the security in the early stages of software development leads to 
ensuring the software quality [27]. 
2.1.3 Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Planning 
This domain mainly focuses on business; it does not concentrate on the problem of data 
violation or unauthorized access. This domain aims at providing emergency plans to ensure 
the business continuity in the event of a disaster. It consists of two sub-domains, which are 
the Business Continuity Planning (BCP) and the Disaster Recovery Planning (DRP). For 
organizations, the BCP requires a comprehensive approach to ensure the continuity of the 
organization's business even after the occurrence of disasters, such as a natural disaster and 
even power outages. On the other hand, the DRP deals with the procedures of how the 
organization can resume its business after major disruptions. However, both sub-domains 
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have several common considerations include the development, testing, updating of the 
essential actions for protecting the critical processes of the organization's business from 
being influenced by a disruptive event such as a network failure [28]. 
2.1.4 Cryptography 
Cryptography is protecting the stored and transmitted data from being understood or read 
by unauthorized parties. Encryption is the process of transforming the plaintext into 
ciphertext using several methods such as transposition and substitutions. On the other hand, 
the process of returning the plaintext is called the decryption. The strength of encryption 
depends on the algorithm and the key. Based on the key, there are two main types of 
cryptography, which are symmetric and asymmetric cryptography.  The symmetric 
cryptography system utilizes the same key for encrypting and decrypting the information 
such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm, whereas the asymmetric 
cryptography system utilizes a pair of keys which are called public and private keys. The 
public key is used for enciphering the plaintext, and the private key is used for deciphering 
the ciphertext. A common example of asymmetric cryptography system is the RSA 
algorithm [29]. 
2.1.5 Information security and risk management 
Information security and risk management is an important cybersecurity domain that 
focuses on identifying data assets, risk management, and mitigation. Also, this domain 
includes the organizational structures, the importance of security awareness training, as 
well as the development of standards, procedures and guidelines to address the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information system [30]. 
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2.1.6 Law, Investigation, and Ethics 
Cybersecurity crimes have become very dangerous to organizations as well as individuals. 
We often hear about internal and external attacks that cost organizations billions of dollars. 
Statistics show that one of the main motivations of cybercrimes is the financial gain, as we 
will discuss later in this Chapter. The stolen information can be resold in a black market 
for a financial gain. Therefore, the public and private sectors have worked together to 
establish rules and regulations about cybersecurity crimes, and how to deal with the 
perpetrators. This domain addresses ethics and compliance with various regulatory 
frameworks as well as the understanding of the laws that associated with the cybercrimes 
and the liabilities to these laws. Also, this domain focuses on the basics of conducting 
investigations to determine if a crime has occurred, as well as the evidence gathering 
techniques [31]. 
2.1.7 Operations Security 
Security operations domain focuses on identifying the critical data and the execution of 
specific measures that eliminate or mitigate the risk of the adversary attacks on the 
information system. This domain describes the controls over the resources (such as 
hardware and media) that needs to ensure the security, as well as the definition of the 
operators with access privileges to any of these resources [32]. 
2.1.8 Physical and Environmental Security 
This domain addresses the problem of securing the physical environment that affects the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the organization's information system. This 
domain examines the infrastructure and physical environment around the information 
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system against physical threats such as natural disasters, emergencies, sabotage, and even 
the electric power issues. The physical security includes alarms, guards, and locks [33]. 
2.1.9 Security Architecture and Design 
This domain essentially concentrates on securing the hardware, software, and operating 
system of the organization. This domain covers several topics such as the evaluation 
criteria, the distributed environment security issues, as well as the security models that 
provide the framework for ensuring the organization's security policies. Examples of 
security models that assist in designing a system to protect the organization's assets are the 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [34]. 
Furthermore, an example of evaluation criteria is the Software Engineering Institute 
Capability Maturity Model Integration (SEI-CMMI) [35]. 
2.1.10 Telecommunications and Network Security 
This domain tackles the problem of securing the transmitted information over the private 
and public communication networks. It includes the structures, transmission formats and 
transport methods of the communication networks. This domain involves protecting 
transmitted data, detection and correction of transmission errors, intrusion detection and 
response, network attacks and abuses as well as different network protocols such as 
connection-oriented and connectionless protocols.  It considered as the largest and most 
comprehensive domain of cybersecurity. The Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) model is 
an important area of this domain which was developed to assist the vendors in developing 
interoperable network devices. The OSI model consists of seven layers that describe the 
procedures of how the applications can communicate over the network [1]. 
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2.2 Classics System Security Characteristics 
Every secure information system should satisfy three classic security characteristics; 
breaches to these characteristics are considered undesirable behavior. These characteristics 
are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Confidentiality ensures that only authorized 
parties who have sufficient privileges may edit or view the information. The most common 
tool used to achieve confidentiality is encryption. Integrity, probably more critical than 
either confidentiality or availability, ensures that the stored data on organization resources 
is correct and unaltered by unauthorized parties or malicious applications. Measures to 
protect integrity include error-checking methods such as checksums and file hashing. 
Availability means that network resources are readily available to authorized users. 
Although a secure computer must prevent access attempts by unauthorized users, it still 
must allow immediate access to authorized users; for instance, a banking customer should 
be able to check their balance or withdraw their funds effortlessly [36]. 
Violations of the security properties can occur during insider and outsider attacks [37]. 
Despite numerous reports of destructive outsider attacks, both accidental and malicious 
insider attacks put a lot of corporate data at risk. Predominantly, organizations do not know 
how much data they have at risk. The inside attacker has one or more of the following 
advantages: authorized system access, knowledge about the organization’s system, the 
ability to reveal the organization system vulnerabilities to outsiders, and trust by the 
organization [21, 38]. The Insider Threat Center of Computer Emergency Response Team 
(CERT) defines the malicious insider threat as: 
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"A malicious insider threat is a current or former employee, contractor, or business 
partner who has or had authorized access to an organization's network, system, or data 
and intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a manner that negatively affected the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization's information or information 
systems" [39]. 
2.3 Types of Insider Attacks 
According to the CERT Insider Threat Center, there are four primary types of insider 
attacks, classified based on the similarity of attack patterns analyzed among more than 
seven hundred real insider attack cases: fraud, IT sabotage, insider theft of intellectual 
property (IP), and espionage [39]. Figure 1 shows the CERT breakdown of intentional 
insider attacks targeting the United States. 
2.3.1 Fraud 
Fraud usually targets financial services and is one of the crime types where the attacker 
maliciously accesses information, stealing credit card data or changing the data for 
financial gain. This type of malicious crime could be committed even by employees who 
have low-level access to the organization data or even customers. Fraud may continue for 
a considerable period before it is identified [39]. 
An example of fraud includes the fraud case that occurred at the military contractor’s office 
where a member of the computer help desk team took advantage of his position for creating 
a fake e-mail address on the military system. He fraudulently requested replacement parts 
of equipment from the vendor using the fake e-mail address. The vendor expected that the 
original parts of equipment would be restored later after the replacement parts were sent. 
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The fraudulent member put his home address for receiving the shipments. The fraud was 
successful, with shipments being sent to the employee for more than twenty months. The 
employee received five hundred products at a cost of around $8 million and sold around 
ninety products on the Internet for more than $0.5 million. The fraudulent employee was 
convicted and sentenced to four years imprisonment and ordered to pay the amount of $8 
million to the vendor [39]. 
2.3.2 IT Sabotage 
Usually, the main purpose behind IT sabotage crime is revenge. For instance, disgruntled 
workers cause damage to IT systems or destroy data. Unlike fraud, IT sabotage is 
committed by insiders who have high-level access to the organization’s system, such as 
database administrators, network managers, and system programmers. The preparation of 
IT sabotage is typically done while the attacker is still working at the organization, but the 
execution of the IT sabotage may occur after the employment termination [39]. 
A case of insider IT sabotage is presented in [39]. Around one thousand files related to 
employee compensation were deleted from an organization by a disgruntled former 
employee of a human resources department. After the employee had been dismissed 
from the organization, he broke into the organization’s systems remotely using his previous 
privileges. To implicate another person in this crime, the attacker modified the payroll 
records of his former coworker. He increased the salary and added substantial bonus to 
her payroll records. The attacker also used the last name of this female coworker to send 
an e-mail to senior managers containing some parts from the deleted files. He was angry 
at this coworker because she rejected his previous romantic interest. The attacker was 
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convicted and sentenced to eighteen months of imprisonment and was ordered to 
pay more than $90,000 as compensation. 
2.3.3 Insider Theft of Intellectual Property 
The aim of insider theft of intellectual property (IP) is to steal the IP using IT resources. IP 
theft includes stealing business plans and source codes. These crimes are usually 
committed by insiders who are aware of the IP value, such as scientists, programmers, and 
engineers. The main purpose behind IP theft is personal gain, where the attacker sells the 
stolen IP to a competitor company or utilizes the stolen IP for his own company [39]. For 
example, a government organization responsible for maintaining a reliable medical 
database was contracted formally with a programmer to help create their programs. Prior 
to the termination of the contract, the contractor was informed that his privileges to access 
the system had been disabled and his responsibilities were reduced. After these actions 
taken by the organization against him, the programmer resigned from the organization. 
However, before he quit the organization, he installed a back door into the system with 
administrator privileges. The attacker used the installed back door to attack the 
organization three times over two weeks to steal source codes and password files from 
the system. The organization was alerted by the large amount of remotely downloaded 
files. The downloaded files were traced. Then the attacker was convicted and sentenced 
to five months in jail in addition to paying around $10,000 as compensation [39]. 
2.3.4 Espionage 
Espionage is the process of obtaining secret or confidential information without the 
permission of the information holder. Espionage may target governments, organizations, 
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and even individuals. But the term “espionage” is mostly related to spying on veritable 
enemies and is usually committed for military purposes [39, 40]. 
An example of espionage is the Robert Philip Hanssen case, known as possibly the worst 
intelligence disaster in US history. Hanssen was an FBI counterintelligence agent who 
began spying for the KGB in 1985. Using his privileges, he voluntarily passed highly 
classified national security and counterintelligence documents to Soviet intelligence 
officers in return for diamonds and large quantities of cash. As a counterintelligence agent, 
he could monitor the FBI’s surveillance of the KGB and lead investigators down false 
trails, which allowed him to continue leaking classified information for an extended period. 
He was discovered after a Soviet spy had switched over to the CIA. Hanssen was eventually 
caught, found guilty on fifteen charges of espionage, and sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole [41, 42]. 
 













2.4 Motivations behind Insider Attacks 
Conducting an insider attack is risky and, in many cases, highly dangerous, so what would 
make an individual decide to commit such an action? Motivations for conducting insider 
attacks are highly diverse, but they can be classified into four basic categories, forming the 
acronym MICE: money, ideology, coercion, and ego [43–45]. An attacker may seek 
monetary payment if they face a large debt or simply have expensive tastes. Many have 
betrayed their organization or country for personal financial gain. 
Ideology as a motivation can take various forms. One is political in nature, such as 
procommunism. In 2002, Ana Montes, an analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
was found guilty of spying for the Cuban government. She was recruited by the Cubans as 
a result of her disagreement with US policies toward Latin America and motivated by 
political ideology [46]. Another politically motivated insider attack penetrated the Greek 
cell phone provider Vodafone. A malicious software was injected into a phone switch to 
control the incoming and outgoing calls for specific numbers. The primary goal of this 
attack was to eavesdrop on the prime minister and prominent legislators. When exactly the 
malicious software was injected and what information was leaked are unknown. The attack 
was accidentally discovered in 2005, when the malicious software was incorrectly updated 
after the beginning of tapping. The incorrect update conflicted with other system processes 
and initiated an alarm. The attack was reported as an insider threat and was attributed to an 




 Ideology can also take the form of fanatical convictions, such as extreme religious or anti-
establishment beliefs or the idea that their actions are somehow helping people or an 
oppressed portion of society. For instance, the WikiLeaks leakage is a famous insider attack 
that targeted sensitive classified documents. WikiLeaks is a well-known journalistic 
website that leaked the confidential information of governments. Private Bradley Manning, 
who was the US Army intelligence analyst, violated US information security and had 
legitimate access to a secure network belonging to the US Department of Defense. Over 
250,000 secret US embassy cables were leaked and passed to WikiLeaks. To conduct this 
attack, Manning utilized his authority to access a computer with a writable drive. He 
smuggled the data out on a rewritable CD (music CD) [48]. Manning was depressed by US 
counterterrorism operations in Iraq. “Manning said he’d sought to make the world a better 
place” [49]. 
Coercion, commonly used as blackmail, is the forced participation of an insider in an attack 
against their will. They may not always be aware of their participation, making them an 
unwitting passive insider. An example of an insider attack through coercion is the Northern 
Bank headquarters robbery in Belfast, Ireland. Late in the evening of Sunday, December 
19, 2004, armed and masked gang members arrived at the homes of two Northern Bank 
executives. Pretending to be police officers, the gang members entered the homes, taking 
both families as hostage at gunpoint. The following day, both executives were instructed 
to go to work as usual or risk the deaths of their families. That night, the armed men entered 
the underground vaults of the bank, where they took over twenty-six million in pounds 
sterling and smaller quantities of various other currencies, including US dollars and euros. 
Who committed the crime is still unclear, but all hostages survived the incident [50, 51]. 
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Ego encompasses both personal and psychological motivations. Personal motivations are 
highly diverse and wildly unpredictable. They include anger, revenge, problems at work or 
home, and divided loyalties. Psychological motivations—including mental instability and 
sociopathic behavior, such as finding thrill or adventure in malicious acts—can be detected 
in some cases by preemployment testing and evaluations. However, this is not foolproof, 
and many cases are not detected. In 2001, a series of letters containing anthrax arrived at 
locations at several places in the United States. It took the US government years to figure 
out how this had happened [52]. Bruce Ivins was a scientist at Fort Detrick, the army’s 
biological defense labs, and he was deeply troubled; he had signed documents authorizing 
the organization to look at his medical records, but no one took care. Long before the 
anthrax attacks, Bruce’s psychiatrist thought that he was the most dangerous patient she 
had ever seen in her entire career. When the anthrax attacks occurred, even though she did 
not know he was working with biological agents, she immediately thought that Bruce was 
behind these attacks. Bruce sent so many red flags; he e-mailed his own staff, complaining 
about his increasing paranoia. Even though the staffers were afraid he was going to hurt 
them, nobody reported his case. Bruce’s case ended up in the newspaper with the headline 
“Paranoid man in charge of deadly anthrax” [53, 54]. 
As seen in many cases, usually, more than one underlying motivation is behind a malicious 
act. John Walker, a US Navy warrant officer, was found guilty in 1985 of passing one 
million classified messages to the Soviet Union over a seventeen-year period [37, 55]. John 
was known to have a major ego, driving him to take risks in life to prove his superior 
abilities, displaying sociopathic behavior. He also took great joy in engaging in dangerous 
acts, committing his first crime as a young boy and never looking back. Walker was also 
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paid large sums of cash, which he initially used to pay off debts but eventually used to 
supplement his insatiable spending habits [56]. He embodies the money and ego prongs of 
MICE; these dual categories make the detection of insiders that much more complex as no 
two insider motivations are the same.  
Some insiders carefully plan out their intentions and deliberately take steps to put 
themselves in the best position to carry out these attacks, as seen with the Walker case. 
However, not all individuals fall into the role of malicious insider through long-term 
scheming. A major life change such as a divorce, unexpected debt, or the loss of a job may 
trigger an insider to commit an attack on a whim. When an insider’s opportunities and their 
motivations align, the environment for an insider attempt is created. Because of the 
expansive nature of motivations behind insider attacks, combined with the multitude of 
insiders and sensitive positions, prescribing a formula to identify and stop all insider threats 
before they occur is difficult. However, steps such as data encryption, access management, 
and log monitoring can be taken to reduce the ability of insiders to commit these attacks 
and mitigate the damage they’re capable of inflicting. 
2.5 Impact of Insider Attacks 
According to the 2018 insider threat report from Securonix Security Analytics, based on 
an online survey of 472 cybersecurity professionals about the insider threats that faced their 
organizations, 66% of the organizations consider insider attacks more likely to happen than 
external attacks. Moreover, 44% perceive that outsider and insider attacks have the same 
impact, whereas 42% believe that insider attacks are more damaging than outsider attacks 
[57]. Figure 2, shows the vulnerable assets targeted by insider attacks. 
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Furthermore, the true cost of a successful insider attack is hard to determine; however, 27% 
of the organizations estimate the cost of each successful insider attack in range of $100,000 
to $500,000, whereas 21% estimate the cost ranges between $500,000 and $2 million, and 
9% believe that the cost exceeds $2 million [57]. The cost is not limited to financial losses 
and may include that of the incident response, loss of reputation, and loss of customer 
loyalty—a catastrophic impact on organizations. 
 
Figure 2: Vulnerable Assets For Insider Attacks 
2.6 Insider Threat Detection: Existing Solutions 
Although there are several security tools for detecting insider threats, as per the insider 
threat report, only 36% of the organizations have formal insider threat detection programs. 
Some existing solutions to insider attacks are data loss prevention, data encryption, identity 
and access management, monitoring users’ behavior, and endpoint security. Moreover, 
Securonix’s report revealed that 63% of the organizations use IDS or IPS to detect the 





















available security information [57]. More details about the existing techniques for detecting 
insider attacks are presented in the literature survey. 
Recently, a new research direction was established to distinguish between the benign and 
malicious activities of employees [18, 26]. The aim of the new research direction is to 
detect the malicious insider activities beforehand. Therefore, it can serve as an early 
detection system from the insider attacks. This direction of research is based on human 
physiological signals (i.e., human bio-signals) such as EEG and ECG signals. 
Physiological signals provide clear ideas about human emotions. EEG signals are brain 
waves—delta, alpha, beta, gamma, etc.—whereas ECG signals pertain to heart rate. 
2.7 Summary 
Chapter two provides the research's background by discussing the cybersecurity and 
presenting the classic system security characteristics which are the confidentiality, the 
integrity, and the availability of the system. According to CERT, the formal definition for 
the insider threats has been presented. Also, the four types of insider threats have been 
discussed which are fraud, IT sabotage, IP theft, espionage. Several examples have been 
discussed to explain the four types insider threats. 
Four motivations which are money, ideology coercion and ego behind each insider attack. 
Where the insider attack may be conducted for a single motive, which facilitates the 
identification of this attack by conventional methods. on the other hand, the detection of 
insiders who aim at more than one motivation is more complex. The four motivations of 
insider attacks have been discussed. The devastating impact of internal attacks on 
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companies has been explained, which include not only the financial losses, but also the 
cost to respond to the incident, loss of reputation, and the loss of customer loyalty. 
The existing solutions of insider threats utilized by organizations have been presented. 
Presenting these solutions were based on a recent insider threat report that provided by 
Securonix. This report survived 472 cybersecurity professionals. The report revealed that 
most of organizations use intrusion detection and prevention, and the user log management 
techniques to detect the insider attacks. 
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3 CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter discusses the importance of increasing awareness of insider attacks and 
presents some research that aims to increase such awareness. This chapter additionally 
provides a categorization for existing strategies to mitigate the risk of insider threats. Each 
category will be discussed separately, and several methods from each category will be 
presented. The research gap in the field of insider attack detection will be discussed by 
presenting the limitations of each category, with emphasis on methods that utilize human 
bio-signals as they are in the area of this research. 
3.2 Awareness of Insider Attacks 
When you hear the word “hacker” or “attacker,” often, an external attacker comes to mind. 
Numerous officers in the cybersecurity field are more concerned about outsider threats 
because they perceive the enemy as outside the organization. Therefore, almost all the 
military, educational, and financial organizations have several mechanisms and defensive 
actions to defeat the outside attacker. However, the insider threat is considered as one of 
the most complicated situations to deal with in cybersecurity. According to an Association 
of Certified Fraud Examiners report, organizations and companies in the United States lost 
around 5% of their revenue because of fraudulent insider attacks. In addition, about two-
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thirds of the malicious fraud cases faced by US organizations are conducted by insider 
employees [58]. An inside attacker has more privileges, facilities, and advantages than an 
outside attacker. Moreover, according to a report by the Intelligence and National Security 
Alliance (INSA), no training and qualification programs exist that can used as a reliable 
framework to tackle insider attacks [59, 60]. For these reasons, raising the awareness of 
organizations about the insider threat risk is important. Consequently, some researchers 
and institutes tackle the problem of increasing awareness by developing strategies as well 
as providing training and courses about insider attacks. 
For example, Ortiz et al. [61] described the necessary processes to develop a training 
environment for insider threat situations. Their study aims at ensuring that cognitive 
processing and some insiders’ behaviors should be included in the training environment. 
They encouraged to utilize serious gaming, an area of game development for the purpose 
of training. Moreover, they encouraged the training designers to use three-dimensional 
game development tools, such as Unreal Engine, to simulate the insider threat training 
environment. Ortiz et al. [61] suggested that the development process of the training 
environment include some essentials, such as scenario narratives, artistic components, 
training components, and programmatic components. Furthermore, they proposed an 
insider threat training scenario that consists of two levels of conditions: the control 
condition and the insider threat condition. 
Moreover, Chi et al. [62] from Florida University describe the guidelines for implementing 
an educational virtual lab that would enhance the knowledge and increase the security skills 
of trainers regarding insider threats. They implemented training modules utilizing the 
CyberCIEGE scenario development kit. CyberCIEGE is an educational security game 
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supported by some US governmental organizations, among them the US Navy and the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. This video game allows students to design the 
environment of the corporate’s network and customize several attack situations that could 
target this corporation, including physical and logical attacks [63]. The training module 
proposed by Chi et al. [62] includes three types of insider attacks: fraud, IT sabotage, and 
IP theft. 
On the other hand, the Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) offers a new security course 
for software developers. The course focuses on insider threats and their devastating 
consequences on security. This course was proposed as a practical activity for students. 
Students are divided into groups; each group consists of four to six students and is 
responsible for designing and implementing a reasonable-sized security system. However, 
one student in each group will play the role of an inside attacker and will try to design and 
implement some vulnerabilities in the system, such as leaving back doors in the source 
code to be utilized maliciously later. This student is informed secretly by e-mail to play the 
role of the inside attacker. The course gives a chance for software development students to 
be aware of insider threats [64]. 
3.3 Insider Attack Detection Methods 
Because of the major damage caused by insider attacks, detection and protection from these 
attacks became a necessity. To achieve this goal, researchers have proposed several 
methods to detect and relieve the risk of these attacks. Although researchers have utilized 
different sciences in their methods, the main goal of these methods is to detect and protect 
from insider threats. The conducted research so far aims to answer the following questions: 
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1. How the insider threat will be identified? 
2. In case of insider attack, how to enhance defenses against such an attack? 
3. What is the amount of risk on the organization when a specific user conducts an 
insider attack? 
In the following parts of this chapter, a literature survey about insider attack detection 
methods has been conducted. The aim of this survey is to investigate the previous 
approaches to detect insider attacks as well as discuss their shortcomings, in addition to 
providing a categorization of these methods. In our classification, we relied on the 
technique used in each method of detecting insider threats. Based on the threat-detection 
technique, insider attack detection methods can be classified into five categories. Figure 3, 
illustrates the taxonomy of insider attacks detection methods. 
 





















3.3.1 Anomaly Detection Methods 
These methods usually come as software or hardware that monitors several devices, such 
as computers, communication networks, and logging information, to identify normal 
activities and attempt to build a model containing the characteristics of these activities. In 
addition, these methods aim to identify malicious activities that violate and deviate from 
this model [65]. Anomaly detection methods are often known as intrusion detection 
methods, which are approaches widely used for detecting external attacks. Although 
detecting insider attacks is more complicated than detecting external attacks since the 
inside attacker is a legitimate user with authorized access to the system and can commit 
attacks using his privileges, external threats can be detected more easily via sensing 
infiltrations to the system or any unauthorized and unusual behavior. However, some of 
the intrusion detection methods are adapted to identify the insider attacks based on the 
differentiation between the normal and malicious activities of insiders [66, 67].  Detecting 
insider threats using anomaly detection methods can be classified into indicator-based 
methods and scenario-based methods. 
3.3.1.1 Indicator-Based Methods 
In [68], the authors proposed an insider attack detection system based on the indication of 
the employee’s suspicious behavior. This approach works as part of intrusion detection 
systems. It assesses the employee’s behaviors based on several types of log information 
collected during the employee’s activities. The logging information stored in a dedicated 
database are the device ID, user ID, activity name, time stamp, and attributes of each 
activity. The system updates the employee’s profile through analyzing the stored logging 
information that has been observed from the employee’s activities hourly. The analyzing 
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process divides the employee’s profile into three parts: current, previously suspicious, and 
normal observations. Utilizing the previously suspicious and normal observations, the 
system can assess the deviation of current activities from the previously observed activities. 
The system has three levels of alert: the first alert takes place when the organization’s 
policies are violated; the second alert happens when the specific employee’s act exceeds a 
threshold level of anomalies; and the third alert occurs during a deviation between the 
employee’s activities and his profile records. 
Ambre and Shekokar [11] utilized the log management technique to build a log monitoring 
system for detecting insider threats. The log management technique consists of two related 
aspects, which are log analysis and event correlation. Log analysis deals with collecting, 
analyzing, and filtering log files (i.e., computer files that record several events for computer 
operating systems and users, such as system information, keystrokes, and data 
manipulation). On the other hand, event correlation is the process of finding mutual 
relationships among several events. Unlike offline monitoring approaches, which suffer 
from the inability of detecting attacks in real time, Ambre and Shekokar proposed a 
continuous monitoring system for the log files. However, given the huge number of log 
files in the network and types of malicious activities, analyzing and correlating different 
events would be extremely difficult. As a result, Ambre and Shekokar considered only 
three activities that indicate malicious events: Internet control message protocol (ICMP) 
requests, unsuccessful log-ins, and rebooting the server. 
Moreover, detecting insider threats is not enough because detection always takes place 
after the attack. Predicting insider threats reduces the consequences and impact of these 
threats. Schultz [10] proposes a framework to predict and detect insider threats that uses 
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multiple indicators based on the best practice. Each indicator’s contribution is represented 
mathematically by weight. The indicator’s weight depends on the number of incident 
results from that indicator. Equation 3.1 shows the mathematical representation of 
Schultz’s approach: 
𝑋𝑒 = 𝑉1𝑋1𝑖 + 𝑉2𝑋2𝑖 + 𝑉3𝑋3𝑖 … … + 𝐶                                           (3.1) 
where Xe is the predictive value, X1i is the first indicator, V1 is the first weight, and C is 
the constant. 
The indicators suggested by Schultz [10] are deliberate markers, meaningful errors, 
preparatory behavior, correlated usage patterns, verbal behavior, and personality traits. The 
previous indicators are listed from the highest to the lowest weight based on Schultz’s 
framework, whereas the weight for each one can be calculated from the indicator’s density 
after carefully analyzing the number of attacks accrued. 
3.3.1.2 Scenario-Based Methods 
Zargaret et al. [66] utilized the raw logs of user network sessions to detect insider attacks. 
They proposed a method called XABA, which analyzes the raw logs of each network 
session to detect abnormal activities. Based on the user behavior profile, which represents 
the exclusive user behavior and potential access, XABA analyzes the network traffic to 
detect the activities and patterns that violate the user profile meaningfully. The researchers 
in [66] classified XABA as a zero-knowledge approach because it is independent of any 
log syntax or any data entry about the user. XABA has been designed to detect five diverse 
scenarios of insider attacks that have a common feature, which is the misuse of the 
exclusive user behavior. The five scenarios are (1) betrayer admin, (2) third-party back 
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door, (3) credential sniffer, (4) e-mail spoofing, and (5) foothold hosting. Table 1 illustrates 
the description of these scenarios. Moreover, XABA consists of five units: 
1. Session gathering utilizes the user IP address to collect the user sessions by 
analyzing the network traffic. 
2. Session PBI (potential behavior indicator) making utilizes text mining to analyze 
the user session and extract useful information such as time stamps and the IP 
address. 
3. Anomaly detection checks for malicious user sessions. 
4. Insider detection matches malicious behavior with user-exclusive behavior. 
5. Alert prioritization utilizes the suspicious degree to prioritize alerts. 
Table 1: The Description of XABA Scenarios 
Scenario Name Scenario Descriptions 
Betrayer Admin Detecting the Traitor admin who misapply his privileges. 
Third Party 
Backdoor 
Detecting the web applications that stealthy provides 
server's control to the backdoor developer. 
Credential Sniffer Detecting the insider who sniffs the user's credentials 
E-Mail Spoofing Detecting the insider who spoof the user's e-mails 
Foothold Hosting 
Detecting the insider who Intentionally download a 
malicious software from the e-mail attachment. 
Another approach that aims to mitigate the risk of insider threats by detecting inside 
attacker scenarios was proposed in [69]. Young et al. [69] use an ensemble with an 
unsupervised learning technique to detect insider threat scenarios without any prior 
knowledge about the kind of scenario and when it would take place. They conducted their 
experiments on a well-known database collected by the Advanced Research Projects 
Anomaly Detection at Multiple Scales (ADAMS) program, which consists of the data of 
39 
 
around 5,500 users [70]. The database contains several user actions, e-mails, log-in/log-off 
time stamps, printer URLs, and instant messages. Furthermore, Young et al. developed 
insider attack scenarios based on those created by the red team, an independent evaluator 
group who utilizes their experience in developing a description about several insider attack 
scenarios [39]. Additionally, the proposed scenario-based detector by Young et al. consists 
of a combination of three components, which are the classifier and the indicator-based and 
anomaly-based detectors. Table 2 illustrates the proposed scenarios by Young et al. [69] 
and the corresponding Red-Team scenarios. 
Table 2: The Proposed Scenarios by Young et al. [57] 







The insider uses the organization IT resource to steal 
IP address. This scenario usually conducted by 
salespeople, engineers and scientists to get advantage 
of IP addresses in their work.  
 Anomalous 
encryption 
 Bona Fides 
 Manning Up 
(Redux) 
Saboteur 
The technical insider such as a system administrator 
uses the IT resources to harm the organization. This 




 Layoff Logic 
Bombs 
 Survivor's Burden 
Fraudster 
This scenario is conducted for a financial gain by low-
level employees. The insider aims at destroying or 
denying the organization's data. The insider in this 
attack is usually recurred by outsider attacker. 
 Hiding undue 
Affluence 
 Indecent RFP 
 Masquerading 2 
Ambitious 
Leader 
This insider is usually an IP thief motivated by the 
ambition to steal as much as possible before leaving 
the work. 
 Insider Startup 
 Selling Login 
Credentials 
Rager Insider uses threatening, vociferous language in his 




This scenario is usually unintentionally conducted by 





3.3.2 Honeypot Traps 
Information is power; the more you know about your enemies and how they operate, the 
more power you have against them. One of the tools that assist in gathering information 
from attackers is a honeynet, a network-connected computer software or even a device that 
appears to be attractive and vulnerable. Honeynets were designed expressly to be attacked 
and to attract attackers just as honey attracts bears [71, 72]. 
A honeynet contains multiple honeypots. A honeypot has no production value and no 
authorized activity; it sits on the organization’s system within its containing honeynet to 
be attacked because a honeypot can be accessed directly without any authorization [73]. 
All access to a honeypot is considered inimical. Any connection started from a honeypot 
to the external network is considered as an indication that the honeynet has been 
compromised. This connection is usually initiated by an attacker to download some 
malicious tool kit that will be used to commit his attack and to hide his trace from being 
tracked [74]. Without the knowledge of the attacker, the honeypot monitors every action 
of the attacker, and it strives to capture as much data as possible.  
Data control is an important concept in deploying the honeypots. Data control means that 
the attacker must be prevented from using the compromised honeypot to attack other 
computers. Thus, the attacker will be locked into a cyber jail and be unable to utilize the 
compromised honeypot to commit an effective attack. A honeynet monitors and captures 
attackers’ logs, actions, and methods [75].  
Honeynets can be classified into three major categories based on the interaction level: high 
interaction, medium interaction, and low interaction. However, the higher the honeynet 
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interaction level, the higher the risk on the operational system since the intruder would deal 
with real systems. Unlike in the low-interaction honeynet, where the intruder deals with 
the systems that emulate vulnerable services, the intruder in the high-interaction honeynet 
deals directly with real vulnerable systems. Moreover, the honeynet interaction level is 
directly proportional to the amount of data that can be collected from the intruders [75].  
Honeynets can detect intentional as well as unintentional insider attacks, where the 
honeynet traps may contain several phantom assets for the organization, such as fake files, 
databases, and servers. These phantom assets play a vital role in the detection of the 
intentional inside attacker, where the honeynet’s traps use unknown IP addresses for 
employees of the organization or are programmed to change their IP addresses 
automatically to deceive the insiders [76, 77]. On the other hand, the computer of an 
organization’s employee can be infected by malware or an Internet worm. This computer 
becomes a source of penetration without the knowledge of the employee. A honeynet can 
detect and protect against such unintentional attacks. 
We did previous work for deploying a distributed high-interaction honeynet at King Fahd 
University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM) [78, 79]. The university’s data traffic was 
captured for twenty different intervals, each of which was around ninety minutes, so the 
total interval for collecting data is thirty hours. More than thirty thousand activities were 
collected during all the experiment’s intervals. Then the data was replayed on the proposed 
honeynet system. Figure 4, illustrates the implemented system. We utilized the following 
tools for implementing the system: 
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1. Honeywall CDROM, which is a high-level interaction honeynet that acts as a 
centralized logging server for the distributed honeypots. 
2. Snort, which is a network intrusion detection/prevention system that was used for 
a real-time traffic analysis. 
3. Sebek, which was used to intercept the attacker’s data after decryption in the 
honeypot. 
4. Wireshark, which was used to capture the university network traffic. 
5. Tcpreplay, which was used to simulate and replay the university network traffic. 
The results show that around 35% of the traffic is considered as low risk, which contains 
traffic such as DHCP requests and NetBIOS datagram services. On the other hand, around 
65% of the traffic is considered as medium risk; most of this traffic is BitTorrent traffic. In 
addition, the proposed system successfully detects an insider attack on Internet Information 








































Figure 4: KFUPM Distributed Honeynet 
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Additionally, multiple deception techniques were proposed by Virvilis et al. [80] to address 
the advanced persistent threats (APTs) that may be utilized by the inside attackers. APTs 
are highly sophisticated attacks targeting organizations and looking to steal personal 
identifiable information or IP. In APTs, the attacker wants to gain access to the network 
and stay there as long as they can to understand what is happening in this network, 
searching for valuable data for exfiltration, i.e., transfer these data illegally from the 
organization. Virvilis et al. divide the APT life cycle into two phases. The first phase is the 
attack preparation (information gathering), and the second phase is the exploitation and 
data exfiltration. Virvilis et al. proposed a specific deception technique for each phase. The 
deception techniques for the first phase are as follows: 
1. Using DNS honeytokens: A honeytoken or honeypot is a system resource that can 
track and analyze malware traffic [73]. DNS honeytokens are fake records in the 
DNS server. Requesting these records accounts as brute-force network scanning, 
when the attacker tries to gather information about the network IPs. DNS is 
configured to initiate an alert when fake records are requested. 
2. Using Web server honeytokens, such as invisible links, fake entries in the Web 
server, and fake HTML comments. 
3. Creating fake social network avatars in major social networks: To appear more 
realistic, these fake avatars must have connections to people from inside and outside 
the organization. In addition, these fake avatars should have real but monitored e-
mails in the organization. Attackers may target these e-mails with malicious 
attachments. Therefore, these avatars can help detect attackers from inside or 
outside the organization. 
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The deception techniques for the second phase are as follows: 
1. Monitoring the darknets, which are unallocated IP addresses: Connections to these 
addresses are done by scanning the darknets’ range of IP addresses either by 
malicious activity or by user mistyping. Therefore, multiple connections are 
counted as suspicious activity. 
2. Deploying a honeynet, which is a security system that attracts hackers to attack: 
These systems appear to be open and vulnerable to attackers, but they have 
deliberate vulnerabilities that are monitored and controlled [69]. 
3. Using the honeytoken or honeypot in the database servers. 
4. Generating and spreading honey-files in the organization’s network: Honey-files 
are files containing fake interesting information to attackers, such as usernames, 
passwords, and credit card numbers [74]. 
5. Creating honey accounts or bait accounts with simple passwords for detecting 
attackers. 
3.3.3 Graph-Based Methods 
Detecting insider threats using graph-based approaches is the process of finding the inside 
attacker’s activities from the data represented as a graph. Graph approaches use several 
techniques to extract useful information about the insider attacks from graph data. The 
graph approach is one of the most powerful insider attack detection methods because of 




1. Interdependent graph data objects 
Graph data objects are dependent on one another, and these objects can strongly 
represent relational data, which makes graph data objects effective in presenting an 
organization network’s information [81]. This can help detect insider attacks 
because using graph objects provides abundant information about the organization 
network, such as the users’ activities on the network computers and, facilitates the 
representation of the organization network and the attacker activities on that 
network. 
2. Robust representation 
Graph objects such as nodes, edges, and attributes can efficiently represent several 
data sets such as computer networks, cell phone networks, social networks, and 
biological data. For example, in computer networks, the computers are represented 
by the graph nodes, whereas the events and activities among these computers are 
represented by the graph edges. The powerful representation of an organization 
network facilitates that of the inside attacker’s activities on that network, which 
improves the detection of such attacks. 
The area of detecting insider threats using graph-based approaches is popular and 
promising. Several methods were proposed to mitigate the risk of insider attacks [81]. Kent 
et al. [82] use bipartite authentication graphs to mitigate insider attacks and assess the 
authentication of an enterprise network. To represent the activity of each user, they 
proposed a Parsons authentication subgraph (PAS), which is a directed subgraph 
representing the authentication user activity over a period of the data set. The period 
depends on the type of user. They select a period of one year for the administrators and 
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general users, whereas the period of compromised users is one month. Figure 5, shows an 
example of PAS. 
 
Figure 5: PAS Graph For a Single User 
Each vertex in a PAS graph represents a computer that the user accessed during the 
specified period, whereas each directed edge represents one or more authentication events 
on the specified computer. From Figure 5, we can notice that the user accessed six 
computers, including the user’s computer (i.e., node C1, normally his/her desktop). From 
each PAS, authors extract some features such as time features, i.e., Tfirst and Tlast, where 
Tfirst represents the first time the authentication event of the user on a specific computer 
was observed and Tlast is the last time the event was observed. Authors use logistic 
regression to classify the general and administrative users as well as differentiate between 
malicious and benign users [82]. Moreover, to conduct their experiments, authors utilize 
the logs of the authentication data set from the LANL enterprise, which contains around 
33.9 billion event logs collected during one year from around twenty-four thousand 
computers. 
On the other hand, because the inside attackers are authorized persons, they do not perform 
abnormal activities all the time, so they try to hide malicious activities over time during 
C1 
C4 C5 C6 C3 C2 
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daily work to avoid being caught. Therefore, discovering rare activities, which are the 
minority compared to daily work, may help in detecting insider threats. A graph approach 
for detecting inside attackers by detecting the rare categories was presented by Zhou et al. 
in [83]. They proposed two incremental algorithms called SIRD and BIRD to solve the 
problem of detecting the rare categories on time-evolving graphs. The algorithms 
dynamically update the detecting models to fit the changes in data during the period. To 
increase the efficiency, these algorithms update only the local changes in the models 
instead of rebuilding the whole models. The SIRD algorithm deals with a single-edge 
update, when there is a change in only one edge. On the other hand, when there are changes 
in a batch of edges in the same period, BIRD facilitates the updating process of the batch 
of edges. In addition, the priors of the minority classes in some applications are hard to 
obtain; therefore, Zhou et al. proposed BIRD-L1, which is a modified version of the BIRD 
algorithm. Instead of detecting the exact boundaries, BIRD-L1 needs only the upper bound 
of all minority classes. Moreover, Zhou et al. tackle the problem of reducing the number 
of updated queries, and they introduce five categories to detect the rare activities as soon 
as possible with the minimum cost during multiple time steps.     
Moreover, Mongiovi et al. [84] use a window-based events technique to detect the attacks 
in the network. This technique utilizes a time window on each network graph to detect 
suspicious behaviors and patterns. Normal behavior is modeled using a number of known 
previous instances of the graph, whereas the incoming graph that represents unknown 
behavior is compared with the normal behavior model to characterize it as malicious or 
benign behavior. Mongiovi et al. proposed a method to detect the significant anomalous, 
contiguous region in the network graph over time by detecting the heaviest dynamic 
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subgraph (HDS). For each weighted subgraph, authors converted the problem of finding 
the HDS to the NP-hard problem. Utilizing the empirical distribution of each edge weight, 
the authors represented the suspicious degree of each edge as a statistical probability 
measure (p-value). The higher positive p-value corresponds to a lower suspicious edge (i.e., 
network event). To approximate the NP-hard problem of HDS, the authors utilized a large-
scale neighborhood search approach to propose an iterative algorithm that can detect the 
suspicious regions in the graph. 
Another approach that traces user behaviors and converts these behaviors into a graph to 
detect malicious insider activities was proposed by Lamba et al. [85]. The graph represents 
the system architecture, where each node in the graph is a system resource. The path 
between the nodes represents the user behavior, which is a sequence of user events, so 
when the user accesses resource B from resource A, an edge between nodes A and B is 
generated. To trace the user behavior, this approach depends on three attributes collected 
from the user’s log files. The attributes are the time stamp, user ID, and resource ID. 
Moreover, normal users’ behaviors fall under different clusters based on the user role or 
task. Each user behavior belongs to only one cluster. Therefore, when the user behavior 
differs from its cluster, this behavior is suspected as an anomaly. Then the anomalous 
behavior needs to be investigated and determined if it is a malicious insider attack. 
However, the number of log files in a network is large compared to the number of threats. 
This challenge affects the results of similar approaches. 
3.3.4 Game-Based Methods 
Feng et al. [86] used game theory to effectively protect against two types of complex 
threats, namely, APTs and insider threats. An APT is considered one of the most dangerous 
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and cost-effective attacks that targets the organization’s security systems. APTs are usually 
conducted by stealthy outside attackers to do considerable harm to the organization. One 
of the reasons that complicate these attacks and make them more harmful is the presence 
of an insider who facilitates these attacks. Researchers in [86] used game theory to 
understand the strategies of these complex attacks, build a security system, and reduce the 
risk of such attacks. They proposed a game that consisted of three characters—the attacker, 
the insider, and the defender—to simulate the interactions among these characters during 
the attack. The game is an extension of a two-player game called FlipIt, proposed in 2013 
by RSA Labs [87]. The role of the insider is to utilize his/her privileges to leak information 
about the organization to the attacker for money, whereas the role of the attacker is to 
utilize this leaked information to create sophisticated attacks against the organization’s 
security system. On the other hand, the defender plays the role of the development of cost-
effective protection methods, where the balance between an organization’s data loss and 
the cost of defense against the attack is taken into consideration. 
On the other hand, the traditional methods of protecting critical constructions such as 
nuclear reactors rely on protection from specific and predefined attacks. These traditional 
methods neglect the attacker’s intentions, which can create a variety of intelligent and 
unexpected attacks. As a solution to this problem, Kim et al. [88] relied on game-theoretic 
modeling to analyze and develop the capabilities of physical protection systems for nuclear 
reactors. The researchers used the advantages of modeling games to create an intelligent 
inside attacker with full knowledge of the nuclear reactor parts, the potential to access the 
reactor, and the intention to harm it. The intelligent virtual attacker works on analyzing the 
physical protection system of the nuclear reactor and develops methods and strategies to 
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penetrate this system by conducting certain actions that will weaken the protection system. 
In addition, the researchers developed an intelligent defender who would protect the system 
by taking actions to protect the reactor and mitigate the risk of inside attacker. The authors 
aim at promoting the protection of nuclear reactors by changing and adopting new physical 
protection systems as well as changing the reactor policies. Furthermore, based on the 
evaluation of the physical protection and proliferation resistance, the researchers categorize 
the insider threats that target the nuclear reactors as in Table 3. 
Table 3: The Categorization of Insider Threats Target The Nuclear Reactors 
Category Types 
Type Authorized individual. 
Capabilities 
1. Knowledge. 




1. Malicious attack on reactor facility. 
2. Sabotage. 
Strategy 
1. Exceeding security measures. 
2. Neutralize protection systems 
3.3.5 Physiological Methods 
Physiology is a part of biology that attempts to explain the activities and functions of living 
beings as well as the chemical and physical phenomena. Moreover, it deals with living 
matter such as cells, tissues, and organs in addition to attributes such as feeling, sensing, 
and emotions. Human physiology is the part of physiology that endeavors to clarify specific 
human body mechanisms and characteristics that make human life possible under vastly 
varying conditions [89, 90].  
Because human physiology explains and deals with many of the functions, characteristics, 
and vital signals that characterize a person and determine his behavior, this part of science 
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has become a fertile environment for studying suspicious human behavior associated with 
insider attacks. Several methods utilizing human physiology have been proposed to detect 
insider threats in organizations. We have categorized these methods as behavioral, 
biometric, and bio-signals. 
3.3.5.1 Behavioral Methods 
Human behavior refers to the observable emotions and physical actions that can be 
performed by an individual. There are two operations by which human behavior can be 
distinguished: It is observable and countable. So, human behavior is an action or emotion 
that can be observed several times. Human behavior may be influenced by several factors, 
such as ethics, attitudes, culture, and persuasion [91, 92]. 
Several studies have been conducted to identify and classify the factors with which an 
insider attacker can be detected. Greitzer et al. [93] classified the human behavioral factors 
that help to understand the insider attacker and mitigate the risk of such attacks into 
individual human factors and organizational factors. The individual human factors 
concentrated on the human personality, temperament, ideology, attitude, and behavior 
issues, whereas the organizational factors concentrated on the work features that affect the 
attitude, satisfaction, protection, and safety of the employee as well as the organization’s 
policies and practices. Greitzer et al. divided the human behavior into classes and sub-
classes up to 7 levels deep. The overall factors are 223 human factors and 39 organizational 
factors. Table 4 shows the main classes and subclasses of the human factors, whereas 






























Unusual Foreign Contact 
Furthermore, Greitzer et al. developed a psychosocial model for predicting insider attacks 
[9]. This model utilized employee behavior to predict insider malicious activities through 
proactive means. The model evaluated employees’ behavior to recognize potential risks. 
This evaluation was based on the automation of different indicators that result from the 
experience and best practices of the Human resources (HR) managers in recognizing 
employees’ psychosocial behavior. Table 5 illustrates an example of the evaluation 
indicators based on the experience of two HR managers. Furthermore, the authors 
recommended three prediction algorithms for analyzing the model's result: nonlinear 
feedforward neural network, Bayesian model, and a linear regression model, which give 




Figure 6: The Main Classes of Organizational Factors by Greitzer et al. [93] 
Table 5: The Evaluation Indicators Greitzer et al. [9] 
Indicator Description 
Disgruntlement Ex. negative feelings about being disregarded. 
Not Accepting Feedback Taking criticism personally, or does not confess to mistakes 
Anger Management 
Issues 
Cannot manage anger range or emotional feeling. 
Disengagement The employee does not cooperate with individuals and groups. 
Disregard for 
Authority 
Neglecting polices and authority feeling above the rules. 
Performance Receiving a worming because of poor performance. 
Stress Physical or mental tension. 
Confrontational 
Behavior 
Aggressive behavior such as intimidation. 
Personal Issues Personal issues interfere with work issues. 
Self-Centeredness Concerned mainly with own welfares 
Lack of 
Dependability 
Undeserving of trust and cannot keep promise 
Absenteeism Continuous absenteeism without reasonable excuse. 
 
3.3.5.2 Biometric Methods 
Human biometrics are measurable and distinctive characteristics that can identify a person. 
Some biometric identifiers such DNA cannot be changed or revoked. Examples of human 
biometrics are iris, fingerprint, and face recognition, as well as human behavioral patterns 















human biometrics used in crime investigations. Following are some studies that used 
human biometrics for the purpose of detecting insider threats. 
The control of eye movement is one of the physiological biometrics that may give an 
indication of voluntary and involuntary actions. Matthews et al. [96] investigated the 
potential for using eye tracking to detect probable insider attacks. Also, they proposed some 
design principles that may be used in real environments to detect such attacks. They utilized 
active indicators, which are stimuli that would evoke from the insider attacker distinctive 
responses, which can be distinguished by tracking eye movements. Matthews et al. utilized 
some eye tracking metrics such as the fixation duration and the saccadic frequency of eye 
movements to detect insider attackers. Such metrics were used to identify some 
characteristics of the insider attacker such as general concealment of interest, implicit 
responses during the malicious act and intentional strategic concealment. Participants in 
the experiments were divided into two groups, the control group which conducted (normal 
- normal) role, and the insider group which changed its role from normal to malicious 
activities and conducted (normal - insider attacker) role. 
Babu and Bhanu proposed a biometric authentication system that utilized keystroke log 
files to mitigate the impact of insider attacks in cloud computing [97]. This approach 
consisted of a combination of trust, risk, access control, and user typing behavior. The log 
files of keystrokes represented user typing behavior. Risk was counted as any activity that 
caused damage to the cloud. Furthermore, they classified insider attackers into three types: 
Two were from the cloud service provider company (a rogue administrator and an 
employee who had access to the clients’ sensitive data), while the third type of insider 
attackers was defined as a rogue administrator from the client company. This system 
55 
 
recognized the users’ behavior by converting the dynamics of the users’ keystrokes into 
numerical features. Then, these features are fed to the Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
classifier to identify the malicious activities, based on the threshold of risk analyzer. To 
provide more flexibility, scalability, and different levels of security for the authentication 
system, the threshold level of the risk was proposed to be dynamic. The extracted features 
from the keystrokes are illustrated in Table 6 where: P is pressing, and R is releasing. 
Table 6: Extracted Features by Babu and Bhanu [83] 
Feature Name Feature value 
X 1 or -1 to identify the data belong to the user or not 
F1 Keywords represented by most frequently 2, 3 or 4 letters 
F2 Difference between P(last key) and P(first key) of the word 
F3 Difference between P(last key) and R(first key) of the word 
F4 Difference between R(last key) and P(first key) of the word 
F5 Difference between R(last key) and R(first key) of the word 
 
Although the user’s typing behavior and keystroke log files can help identify some 
malicious attacks, analyzing only the log files cannot add great impact on preventing 
insider attacks in cloud-computing systems because inside attackers have control over such 
authentication systems. 
Rudrapal et al. [98] propose an algorithm to increase the immunity of the organizations’ 
systems from insider attacks. Their algorithm works as the second line of defense to protect 
the user’s privacy besides traditional authentication, which are the username and password. 
The algorithm utilizes the dynamics of keystrokes to identify the user’s identity. It tends to 
protect the organization from the insider attack when the attacker tries to impersonate 
another person’s identity by using legitimate credentials for a different user. The keystroke 
features for every user are extracted and stored in a database. Then these features are 
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compared with the user’s keystrokes, when the user types a specific text or credentials, 
before authenticating the user. The extracted features rely on the duration between pressing 
and releasing keyboard keys for digraphs and trigraphs, a digraph defined as two keys typed 
one after the other and trigraph as three consecutive keystrokes. The duration between 
pressing the first key and pressing the second key represents the digraph duration, whereas 
the trigraph duration is represented by the duration between pressing the first key and 
pressing the third key or the duration between releasing the first key and releasing the third 
key. Although this approach can prove the authentication and can help verify the user’s 
identity, it does not guarantee protection from insider attacks. The attacker can use his 
legitimate credentials to steal valuable and precious information. Moreover, the furious 
employee can install harmful software such as logic bombs that may cause catastrophic 
damages to the organization. 
3.3.5.3 Bio-signals Methods 
Bio-signals are physiological signals emitted by biological beings, which can be measured 
through electrical probes. In other words, for human beings, bio-signals are tiny electrical 
signals emitted from the human body when the muscles flex or eyes move or even during 
thinking or sleeping. The human body produces thousands of bio-signals every second. 
The most common bio-signals are as follows: 
 Electroencephalogram (EEG) signals: brain signals 
 Electrocardiogram (ECG) signals: heart signals 
 Electromyogram (EMG) signals: muscle movement signals 
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The fact that vital signals are not voluntary is what distinguishes them and makes them 
difficult to imitate. Furthermore, because vital signals reflect the psychological state of a 
human being, these signals can be a distinctive tool to identify internal threats.  
Recently, a new research direction was established to distinguish between the benign and 
malicious activities of employees [99]. The aim of this new research direction is to detect 
malicious insider activities beforehand. Therefore, it can be served as an early detection 
system for insider attacks. This direction of research based on the human bio-signals such 
as EEG ECG or EKG signals.  
Suh and Yim [18] investigated the applicability of using bio-data to detect insider attacks 
in nuclear power plants. They collected the bio-data from only two males, both of whose 
ages were around 25, and one of whom was left-handed. The experiments were based 
entirely on two tests: an emotion test and an intentional wrong decision test. The emotion 
test was based on showing some photos randomly to participants. The authors selected 
about 30 photos related to emotions. These photos could stimulate bio-signals in 
participants. The photos contained natural stimuli as well as immoral stimuli. For example, 
one photo showed a crime scene, whereas another photo showed a smiling child. On the 
other hand, the intentional wrong decision test was based on 140 scenarios that were 
programmed using MATLAB. The participants clicked the YES/NO button to make a 
specific decision. The two participants played different roles in this experiment, where each 
role represented a particular position or job in the organization. Some of these positions 
were truck driver, director, nuclear power plant operator, IT worker, and official in the 
National Intelligence Service. The 140 procedures of this test included crimes such as 
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giving an identity card to strangers and planting a bomb in the organization. Although the 
authors claimed they received promising results, their work had some drawbacks: 
1. The size of the experimental sample is too small, where conducting the experiments 
on two participants surely will provide a low level of confidence in the results. To 
achieve a high level of confidence, the experimental sample size must be more than 
twenty participants [94]. 
2. Some aspects of the experiment are unrealistic. For example, in the intentional 
wrong-decision test, the two participants played different roles, and they occupied 
various unreal jobs, such as IT worker, truck driver, and director, so the participants 
will not be completely affected by making the wrong decisions in these unreal jobs. 
Furthermore, in the emotion test, some images have been presented to the 
participants, such as crime images. This test has two drawbacks. First, such images 
may not represent any real internal violations in the institutions. Second, the 
reactions of the participants from such images are unrealistic and do not represent 
real reactions of the inside attackers. 
3. The participants realize they are conducting experiments related to inside attackers, 
so their emotions may not reflect the attackers’. Such experiments must be 
conducted in realistic situations and include real procedures. 
Moreover, Hashem et al. [99] investigated the usability of detecting insider malicious 
activities by analyzing human electroencephalography (EEG) signals. They conducted 
their experiments on ten participants, five males and five females, whose ages varied from 
18 to 33 years old. Each participant performed three scenarios. The duration of each 
scenario was ten minutes. Two scenarios were malicious, whereas the third was benign. 
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Malicious scenarios were an unauthorized login to a remote computer and the theft of 
source code files from a folder in the lab network, whereas the non-malicious activity was 
a regular office job such as surfing the internet, reading e-mails or using computer 
applications. The brain EEG signals were collected by using Emotiv EPOC device [100]. 
Then, the wavelet transformation was used to decompose the EEG frequencies into 
different sub-bands, which was used as frequency domain features. by recording signals 
from each electrode of the device in the same period. Then, the features are reduced using 
the principal component analysis (PCA) [101, 102]. Hashem et al. used the Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) to differentiate between the malicious and benign signals. Error rate, 
Accuracy, Precision, F-measure, and recall were utilized as measurements in the 
experiments. However, the sample of 10 participants is not enough to prove the results 
accurately [103]. Furthermore, SVM classifier tends to ignore the minority class while 
building the model, especially when dealing with unbalanced data [104, 105]. Ignoring the 
skewness in the data set leads to provide less accurate results. Therefore, in such cases, the 
receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve provides results that are more accurate than 
using accuracy. 
Almehmadi and El-Khatib [106] proposed an access control system (IBAC) based on the 
bio-signals. They used the EEG reactions toward visual stimuli to grant or deny users from 
access the protected resources based on the calculated risk. IBAC was based on the idea 
that users know their intentions of access. So, the system measured the user's intention 
using the amplitude of P300 waveform after stimulating the brain with the question “What 
is your intention to access the resource?". P300 is a positive EEG peak takes place 300 
milliseconds after the visual stimuli. However, the procedure of calculating P300 ignores 
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Gamma brainwaves and relies only on Theta, Alpha and Beta bands. The first experiment 
aimed at detecting the lousy intention of a specific resource. The participants were asked 
to think of burning a lab while looking at random images that represent intentions such as 
burning lab, studying in the lab, and organizing labs. The second experiment aims to detect 
the internal threat using the IBAC system. To this end, participants were informed not to 
access some private folders unless they can do without getting caught and if they were 
caught the experiment failed. 
Furthermore, Almehmadi and El-Khatib [107] used the amplitude of ECG signals, the 
galvanic skin response (GSR), and the skin temperature to detect the insider threats. The 
signals were collected from fifteen students during normal and malicious scenarios. The 
malicious scenario was similar to the second experiment in [106]. The system did not 
utilize different features in the ECG signals; it used the ratio of the average of data that 
each sensor records per second to the standard deviation of the collected bio-signals as 
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Hashem et al. [108] studied the possibility of detecting insider threats using EEG signals 
and tracking eye movements. Twenty-five participants conducted five experimental 
scenarios, three normal and two malicious. The normal tasks aimed to study the reactions 
of the participant while performing benign daily activities, daily activities under stress, and 
high mental workload activities. On the other hand, the malicious scenarios were the SQL 
injections attack and unauthorized remote access. Participants were instructed to conduct 
the malicious tasks and told that no extra rewards if they leave any trace while performing 
the tasks. Hashem et al. extracted two types of features: the EEG features using the wavelet 
transform algorithm and the eye tracking features (i.e., the movements and pupil features). 
Suh and Yim [109] discussed the feasibility of using the EEG signals to predict the insider 
threats in the nuclear environment. Their study aimed to investigate the feasibility of 
developing specific EEG signals to identify an insider before committing the attack. They 
analyzed the difference in the EEG data during the normal brain state and malicious 
actions. They utilized a wearable device to collect the signals from eleven participants. 
During the experiment, the participants had to read some problems about the nuclear 
reactor and click on YES or NO button. Clicking YES button represents a bad action 
whereas NO button represents a good action. To predict the insider threat, they used a 
quantitative EEG analysis to develop two types of indicators which are the relative power 
of (alpha, beta, theta, the sum of alpha and theta and gamma waves) and the ratio of 




Table 7: Summarizing The Surveyed Methods 
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Young et al. [69] 
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authentication graphs to 
represent the activities of 
each user's 
Zhou et al. in 
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SIRD, BIRD and 
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Using the time-evolving 
graphs to detect the user's 
suspicious actions 




Utilizing time window on 
each network graph to detect 








and resource IDs 
Monitoring the user 
behavior in network based 
on graphs. 
Game Based 




Using game theory to 
protect against two types of 
threats, namely the 
advanced persistent threats 
(APT) and the insider 
threats 
Kim et al. [88] 
Intelligent attacker 
and defender 
Using game theoretic 
modeling to analyze and 
develop the capabilities of 
physical protection systems 
for nuclear reactors 
Physiological 
Behavioral 






Using individual human 
factors and organizational 
factors to detect the insider 
threats 




Using the best practice and 
experience of HR managers 
to detect the suspicious 
behavior 
Biometric 




frequency of eye 
movements 
Utilizing the eye tracking 
for detecting the insider 
attackers 





authentication system to 
detect the insider attacks in 
the cloud computing 
Bio-signals 
Suh and Yim 
[18] 
EEG, ECG and 
GSR 
Detecting insider attacks in 
nuclear power plants 
Hashem et al. 
[99] 
Brain EEG signals 
Monitoring brain EEG 




Access control system 




ECG, GSR, and 
Temp 
Detecting malicious insider 
threats  
Hashem et al. 
[108] 
EEG and Eye 
tracking 
Detecting insider attacks 
Suh and Yim 
[109] 
EEG signals 
Monitoring brain EEG 




3.4 Limitations in the Existing Studies 
Despite the great variety of strategies to identify insider attacks, as we have already 
mentioned in the literature of this research, the physiological strategies remain efficient in 
detecting insider attacks and overcoming the shortcomings of most other strategies because 
they depend on fixed metrics related to the human body, where the individual cannot 
change or control these metrics easily. In this section, the limitations of the strategies 
mentioned in the literature will be presented; moreover, the gap in research of detecting 
insider threats will be discussed. 
3.4.1 Limitations of Anomaly Detection Methods 
Although anomaly detection methods are common and used to identify internal attacks as 
they are also used to protect against outsider attacks, these methods have some 
shortcomings. These shortcomings can be summarized as follows: 
1. Huge number of log files and network packets 
Many anomaly detection methods rely on log files and network packets to extract 
the data and behaviors of the users; however, the number of log files in large 
organizations is extremely high. For example, a single user can have thousands of 
log files per workday, so the process of analyzing these log files lengthens the 
detection period of the suspicious behavior of inside attackers. 
2. Detection of predefined attacks 
These methods provide protection against a limited number of insider attacks, 
where the idea behind these methods is to identify specific scenarios or indicators 
of insider attacks as a blacklist [110], where new unknown scenarios are compared 
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with previously known suspicious scenarios in the blacklist to distinguish the 
behaviors of inside attackers. However, in the case of a new insider attack scenario 
that is not listed in the blacklist, this attack will not be recognized by these methods 
before causing catastrophic losses to the organizations. Research has proved that 
even the best application for malware detection can only detect, at most, 87% of 
the latest attacks [111]. Furthermore, the principle of these methods depends on the 
assumption that the number of insider attacks the organizations may face is low. 
On the contrary, it has been proven that the number of internal attacks grows 
because of the rapid development of technology, where these attacks pose a great 
threat to organizations. 
3. Information security staff capabilities 
Angry information security managers and staff who participate in the installation 
and management of anomaly detection devices have full knowledge of the 
capabilities of these devices and can control them, making them suspected as inside 
attackers because they can utilize their knowledge and their facilities to bypass 
these security systems. 
3.4.2 Limitations of Honeypot Traps 
Honeypots and network traps, sophisticated anomaly detection methods, have some 
advantages over traditional malware detection methods. The honeypot approaches can 
detect and protect from unknown malware that have been caught by these traps. Moreover, 
these approaches can provide the opportunity to enhance the security system of the 
organization by providing further investigation and analyzing for anomalies. However, 
honeypots and network traps have substantial shortcomings: 
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1. Complexity of honeynet 
The design and control of the honeynet, especially the high-interaction honeynet, 
is complex because building an emulating system for several network services and 
controlling the attackers are not easy processes; moreover, this emulating system 
must be immune to malware [112]. 
2. Honeynets have the highest risk 
If the honeynet is compromised and controlled by the attacker, the attacker would 
have an opportunity to attack the organization’s resources and use the honeynet as 
a platform to attack different institutions using its IP address, which would expose 
the institution to organization accountability [113, 114]. 
3. Honeynets increase the cost and complexity of the network 
Building a honeynet requires the organization to dedicate resources, systems, and 
IP addresses to the honeynet. This may be expensive and complicate the 
organization network [113]. 
3.4.3 Limitations of Game-Based Approaches 
Although using game theory in designing security games has several advantages, such as 
using intelligent systems for discovering vulnerabilities in security systems and simulating 
characters, game-based approaches have considerable shortcomings: 
1. Lack of scalability 
Most of the security-game models are not scalable where the game consists of two 
or three players. Players represent the attacker, the defender, and the insider 
(betrayer). These models neglect some real-life cases of multiple attackers dealing 
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with multiple defenders because these models treat the whole number of defenders 
as only one, as with the attackers [115]. 
2. Lack of motivation 
One main problem in modeling network security games is the lack of motivation 
from the difficulty of quantifying the value of protecting the organization’s network 
as a result of modeling such games by non-specialist persons in the security systems 
because of confusion between how to assess and how to quantify the security of the 
organization’s network [116]. 
3. Unrealistic Models 
Security games treat the security system as finite, with no errors, which is false in 
real-life situations, where intrusion detection systems are erroneous [115]. 
3.4.4 Limitations of Graph-Based Approaches 
Despite the factors that give graph-based methods advantages and robustness in simulating 
the organization’s network topology to detect network threats, these methods have several 
drawbacks: 
1. Approximate values from NP-complete problems 
Although graph-based methods can represent the structure of the organization’s 
network effectively, detecting insider attacks using these methods could lead to 
approximate results. The insider attack is a sequence of events in the network; each 
event can be represented as an edge. Traversing these edges in the organization’s 
network, which consists of many computers, printers and other resouces, leads to 
nondeterministic polynomial time problems, such as NP-complete or NP-hard 
68 
 
problems. These problems have approximation solutions that may affect the 
detection results [84, 117]. 
2. Unacceptable computing time 
Graph-based methods consume relatively little time when run on small graphs 
(around fifteen to twenty minutes with a graph of three hundred nodes). However, 
in the real world, an organization’s network consists of thousands of computers. 
Detecting insider threats using graph-based approach leads track the insider attack 
events in the graph; the computing time for traversing graph edges to detect such 
threats may lead to NP problems, which cannot be solved in real time [118]. 
3.4.5 Limitations of physiological methods 
Physiological strategies, especially bio-signals, are among the latest strategies to detect 
insider threats. Several factors have contributed to the emergence of such methods, 
including but not limited to the rapid technical development, low cost, and ease of use of 
small bio-signal measurement devices. Detecting insider threats with bio-signals is one 
promising research area. Although these approaches use bio-signals such as EEG and ECG 
signals for mitigating the risk of insider attacks, the existing approaches have some 
considerable shortcomings: 
1. Size of the experimental sample 
The experimental sample size of existing methods is small. Experiments with fewer 
than 20 participants may achieve low credibility and poor confidence scores [103]. 
2. Measurements and classification 
Detecting suspicious behavior using bio-signals is the process of searching for 
minority-class activities compared with normal activities. Existing bio-signal 
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methods did not use the right measurements or more than machine-learning 
classifiers to prove their results. Almost all of these methods relied on accuracy 
alone, which may not be a good indicator. Moreover, they used classifiers that tend 
to ignore the minority class while building their models, especially when dealing 
with the unbalanced data of insider attacks. 
3. Unrealistic experimental scenarios 
In the existing bio-signals methods to detect insider attackers, the experiments for 
collecting bio-signals from participants relied on unrealistic scenarios in which the 
participants were instructed to act suspiciously. This significantly affected 
participants’ decisions and certainly had a negative effect on their locus of control. 
The locus of control, a concept developed in 1954 by Julian B. Rotter, is defined as 
“the degree to which people believe that they have control over the outcome of 
events in their lives, as opposed to external forces beyond their control” [119]. 
When individuals believe that events in their lives derive mainly from their own 
actions and that they are responsible for their actions, they are known as individuals 
with an internal locus of control. On the other hand, individuals with an external 
locus of control believe that events in their lives are affected by external forces 
beyond their control. Giving instructions to the participants affected their locus of 
control and led to a lack of a sense of responsibility for the consequences of their 
actions, thus affecting their brains’ responses [120, 121]. Furthermore, Edward and 
Ryan [122] published a model of human motivation called self-determination 
theory. In the context of self-determination theory, autonomy represents your 
ability to choose not only the things you do but the way in which you do that. 
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Autonomy has a significant impact on human's motivation. The motives of 
individuals who simply conduct an objective that they're responsible for are entirely 
different from the way that they do the same objective when instructions are given. 
So, the truly human acts are associated with the freedom to conduct that act. So, in 
the existing bio-signals approaches, the participants were not truly acting 
suspiciously like real insider attackers, which completely affected the shape of their 
brainwaves as well as the rest of their bio-signals. 
4. Lack of responsibility 
A sense of responsibility arises from the awareness that an individual has control 
over his actions. This awareness stems from linking an action with its consequence 
and from counterfactual reasoning when the individual has a choice to do a different 
action [121]. Responsibility plays a vital role in individual decision-making and in 
intentional antisocial behavior. It has been proven that the feeling of responsibility 
affects brain signals because it is associated directly with regret, which is also 
associated with processes occurring in the brain’s prefrontal cortex [123]. 
Therefore, instructing the participants to act maliciously affected the brain signals 
used in decision-making and feeling. Thus, the participants’ bio-signals do not 
represent real insider attackers’ bio-signals. Moreover, Frith [121] proved that 
volition and responsibility are also influenced by instructions. 
Despite the bio-signal methods in the literature survey, little research has been carried out 
on the area of detecting insider threats using human bio-signals. As we have explained, 
many shortcomings in these methods affect the credibility of the results. One major 
shortcoming was that all the scenarios used in the experiments did not represent real 
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internal attacks to the best of our knowledge. The participants received instructions to act 
maliciously and did not feel responsible about their actions, which affects their bio-signals. 
Therefore, conducting research in this area is promising and may provide useful insight 
into the implementation. 
In this research, the shortcomings of existing bio-signal approaches were taken into 
consideration. We reported the results of 84 participants to achieve high credibility. Also, 
we developed a real insider attack scenario based on physiological considerations, where 
we did not instruct the participants to carry out malicious activities, so they had real 
motivations. The decision-making was left to the participants to perform the attack, so not 
all the participants acted maliciously. Additionally, participants were fully aware that they 
were responsible for their activities as we will discuss in the next Chapter 5. Furthermore, 
to provide more accurate results without relying solely on the accuracy measurement, 
several measurements have been used to ensure the correctness of the results, such as the 
receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve. These measurements would overcome the 
problem of searching for the minority classes as discussed in Chapter 6. 
3.5 Summary 
The difficulty in distinguishing crimes of internal attacks from non-malicious activities is 
one of the reasons internal attacks are a concern for organizations. Increasing awareness 
among the organizations’ employees about insider attacks is one of the solutions to prevent 
such attacks. Several studies that aim to increase the awareness about insider attacks have 
been presented in this study. Some of these studies provide technical solutions, such as the 
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virtual laboratory, to increase the security skills of trainers, while others have developed 
security courses about insider threats. 
Moreover, based on the technique used in the threat detection, the existing detection 
methods of insider attacks have been categorized into five categories which are anomaly 
detection, honeypot traps, graph-based methods, game-based methods, and physiological 
methods. Each of these categories has been discussed, and several examples about each 
category has been surveyed in this chapter. 
Additionally, the shortcomings of the insider attack categories have been discussed, where 
the focus was on the disadvantages of the detection methods that were related more to the 
problem of this research. One of the disadvantages of the existing insider threat 
identification methods is using unrealistic scenarios to simulate the attack from within and 
affecting the nature of the bio-signals being collected. However, the existing bio-signal 
methods to detect insider attacks neglected some of the physiological theories, such as the 
locus of control and the sense of responsibility. In addition, the size of the experimental 




4 CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Overview 
To investigate the research problem, which is the utilization of human bio-signals to detect 
insider attacks, we divided the research methodology into five stages, where each stage 
aims to address a separate objective from this research. Moreover, each stage has its own 
results and deliverables, which are vital to the other methodology stages. Figure 7 
illustrates the stages of the research methodology and the relationship between these stages. 
4.2 Stage 1: The Literature Survey 
The first stage of this research methodology is to survey the literature at it provides full 
and up-to-date understanding about the research problem in addition to delivering the 
shortcomings of existing methods. So, to investigate the problem of insider attacks and to 
explore the existing approaches that aim to protect from such attacks, we conducted a 
literature survey about the methods that tackle this problem.  
We discovered diverse methods of protection from internal attacks and classified these 
methods according to the technique used to identify the attack into five categories. Despite 
the number and variety of existing methods, we have found that only a few researches 
utilize human bio-signals to protect against insider threats [107]. An effective insider attack 
protection system should overcome the disadvantages of previous protection methods. 
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Therefore, in our literature review (Chapter 3, section 3.4.5), we have provided and 
discussed the disadvantages of existing methods that used human bio-signals. Moreover, 
as shown in Figure 7, this stage of research methodology (i.e., literature survey) has played 
an important role in the design of the protection system as it discovers the weaknesses of 
the previous approaches. 
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4.3 Stage 2: Building the Bio-signals Data Set 
Protecting the organizations' security by detecting insider threats is a hot research area, 
despite that only few methods have been proposed recently using human bio-signals. 
Regardless of the number of these solutions, to the best of our knowledge, no data set exists 
that contains such bio-signals for research purposes. The data set for developing this 
research area—and as a reference of comparison among insider attack detection methods 
that use bio-signals—must meet the following conditions: 
1. The data set should contain a sufficient number of bio-signal samples, from more 
than twenty persons [103] . 
2. The volunteers’ bio-signals should be collected through real scenarios that simulate 
the reality of the problem of the research (i.e., insider threats). 
3. Psychological factors should be considered during the scenarios of collecting the 
bio-signals. These factors include the locus of control, decision making, and the 
feeling of responsibility about the consequences of the decision. 
4. The data set should contain real human bio-signals collected during experiments 
and must not contain any autogenerated bio-signals using a simulator. 
Consequently, to build a bio-signals data set that will be used also to design our system, 
which aims at accurately identifying internal violations using human physiological signals, 
the experimental scenarios for collecting the bio-signals from volunteers must be designed 
to simulate real cases. To this end, we have proposed two scenarios. The first scenario 
simulates the presence of an employee in a normal work environment, where the employee 
performs daily routine tasks using the computer. The second scenario simulates the 
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presence of the employee in a normal work environment, but the employee acts 
suspiciously and violates the organization’s laws. In the second scenario, the volunteer has 
the opportunity and decision to carry out internal attacks without his knowledge that such 
violations are part of the experiment. The experiment scenarios are discussed in Chapter 5. 
On the other hand, to build a data set of human physiological signals for detecting inside 
attackers requires identifying which bio-signals will be collected during experiments, 
where these signals are key to solving the main research problem. So through the literature 
review and exploring human physiological signals in some research fields—such as 
emotion recognition, intention detection [14], cryptographic systems (cryptographic key) 
[15], detecting read book genres [16], control systems, and crime detection systems, such 
as polygraphs or lie detectors [17]—several signals (biofeedback and neurofeedback) have 
been identified in these researches. The identified signals are vital in determining human 
moods, behaviors, and emotions. These signals are also important in distinguishing 
between a person’s conditions when performing normal and suspicious activities. In this 
research, the experiments were conducted to collect these influential signals for the design 
of the proposed system. 
This data set has been collected at Hadhramout University in the Republic of Yemen. The 
process of collecting bio-signals and conducting experimental scenarios continued for 
about seven months, where the experiments were conducted in two stages (i.e., suspicious 
and normal activities) according to the availability of the students. Each stage has been 
conducted separately. The data set contains bio-signal files for eighty-four volunteers, 
forty-three of which are males. These bio-signals were collected when volunteers 
performed two types of scenarios: normal work and suspicious activities. As a result of 
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these two types of scenarios, the data set contains four files for each volunteer’s bio-signals. 
Each scenario produces two bio-signal files for each volunteer, the first file containing EEG 
signals and the second one containing ECG signals. 
To protect the privacy of the volunteers, all personal information, such as the volunteers’ 
names and departments, will be removed from the files. To differentiate the files in the data 
set, we have divided the file names into four parts. Figure 8 illustrates the naming process. 
Moreover, we have followed the subsequent rules for naming the files: 
1. Part one of the file name contains a two-digit number that identifies the volunteer’s 
number. 
2. The second part of the file name contains three letters that identify the type of bio-
signals, either EEG or ECG. 
3. The third part of the file name contains only one letter that represents the scenario 
or the behavior of the volunteer; this will be either S for suspicious behavior or N 
for normal behavior. 
4. Part four of the file name consists of one letter that identifies the volunteer’s gender; 
this will be either F for females or M for males. 
The files in the data set are grouped into two separate groups; the first group contains the 
files of the EEG signals for both suspicious and normal scenarios, whereas the second 
group contains the files of ECG signals for both scenarios. Moreover, one of the most well-
known and popular file formats has been used to store the files in the data set: the extensible 
markup language (XML), which can be transformed easily into other files and can be used 
by any programming language. Furthermore, the XML format can store more than one type 
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of signals, such as heart rate, the standard deviation of the peaks and the peaks value, etc. 
where each type has a different style of representation, so storing data such as ECG in XML 
format is easy. Figure 9 shows the data set structure. 
 
Figure 8: Data set Naming Process 
 
Figure 9: Data set Structure 
The EEG signals were collected at a sample rate of 512 samples per second. Each EEG 
signal is represented in the file using ten fields; the first field represents the sample’s 
number, the second one represents the sample’s time, and the rest of the fields represent 
the frequency components of the EEG signal (i.e., delta, theta, alpha1, alpha2, beta1, beta2, 
gamma1, gamma2). Some EEG files contain very few bad signals, which are not recorded 
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in the file because of hardware limitations. In most cases, the bad signals between 
consecutive samples were five seconds at most and were symbolized in the file as NA (not 
available). 
On the other hand, each ECG file consists of three groups of data. The first group, called 
samples, represents the information about each heart pulse and contains the sample 
number, sample time, and raw heart data, which represent the ECG signal value. The 
second group of data contains information about the R peaks, which is the maximum 
amplitude during a specific interval of the ECG wave. The information about the R peaks 
includes peak time, peak value, and the interval between successive R peaks. The third 
group of data contains the heart rate variability value (i.e. SDNN), which is calculated 
every sixty seconds. Figure 10 shows the ECG data representation in the file. 
 
Figure 10: ECG Data Representation 
4.4 Stage 3: Features Extraction 
Using the collected raw physiological signals to detect the insider violations for the 
complexity of these signals and for the associated noise is difficult. Therefore, these signals 
must be preprocessed before use in the proposed system. Moreover, some characteristics, 

















suspicious behaviors. Features are the measurable, independent, and informative 
characteristics extracted from raw signals [23], which makes these signals more effective 
in identifying internal violations. Therefore, it is necessary to change the format of raw 
signals into features using the appropriate equations that will increase the strength of these 
features in determining internal violations. 
Obviously, not all features have the same effect in detecting changes in bio-signals during 
attacks; some of these features should be nominated. On the other hand, the nominated 
features may play different roles in determining internal violations because of the changing 
rate of physiological signals in normal and suspicious activities. Therefore, it is necessary 
to determine the impact of each nominated feature on the accuracy of the proposed system. 
To achieve this, several evaluation criteria were used. Chapter 6 explores the importance 
of each nominated feature. 
4.5 Stage 4: Proposed System 
The idea of the proposed system is to detect malicious activities by distinguishing whether 
the changes in the bio-signals (EEG and ECG) are due to malicious behavior or the normal 
behavior of the employee. Figure 11 shows the schematic diagram of the proposed system. 
The proposed system consists of eight units, each of which has its turn in detecting 
suspicious behavior and mitigating the risk of insider attack. Each unit is discussed 





Figure 11: Schematic Diagram of The Proposed System 
4.5.1 Sensors 
From the schematic diagram of the proposed system, units 1 and 2 represent the sensors, 
which are devices that are frequently used to detect signals or measure a property [124]. 
Sensors have been utilized to capture human bio-signals. Two types of sensors were used 
in our experiments to collect the human bio-signals. The first type is the EEG sensors that 
are part of the NeuroSky MindWave device, whereas the second type is a part of the Wild 
Divine device that is used to collect ECG signals. More details about these devices are 

























This research did not put any restriction on the types of sensors to collect human bio-
signals. Any type of sensor could be used as long as it has the ability to collect bio-signals 
accurately. With the rapid development of science and technology, the shapes, sizes, and 
techniques of these sensors have changed greatly. Several kinds of small, convenient, easy-
to-use sensors have been developed. These sensors can be used extensively by corporate 
employees. An example is the Motorola MC10 tattoo sensor [125], Figure 12 Shows 
several types of sensors to collect ECG signals. 
 
Figure 12: Wearable ECG Sensors 
Furthermore, depending on the sensor types, transforming the received signals from one 
format to another could be done either in the interfaces or in the devices that contain the 
sensors, such as in our case. The NeuroSky MindWave device transforms EEG signals 
from the time domain to the frequency domain using the standard fast Fourier transform 
(FFT) [126]. Because an EEG signal consists of different frequencies, FFT converts the 
EEG signal to its frequency component, i.e., delta, theta, alpha, etc. Figure 13 illustrates 




Figure 13: Transforming EEG From Time Domain To Frequency Domain 
4.5.2 Interfaces 
An interface is hardware and/or software that enables sensors to communicate with a 
computer. The aim of using these units in the proposed system is to receive the collected 
signals from the sensors and record these signals in the computer for analysis. In this 
research, we used two different interfaces: the LightStone Monitor v0.8, to collect the ECG 
signals, and the NeuroExperimenter, to collect the brain signals [127]. These interfaces are 
free, easy to use, and open-source. Thus, the code for collecting the data from the device 
could be traced and modified. 
4.5.3 Features Extractor 
In this unit of the proposed system (i.e., Unit 5), the features of the collected signals are 
extracted. The extracted features will have an influential role in distinguishing between 
activities. The purpose of this unit is to extract the features from both EEG and ECG 
signals. To extract such effective features for distinguishing the inside attacker during 
suspicious behaviors, the process of converting signals into features passes through several 
equations. These equations have been utilized to maximize the differences between 
Fourier Transform 
EEG in Time Domain 




extracted features during normal and malicious activities. MATLAB R2014b was used to 
implement the features extractor unit. The output of the features extractor unit is thirteen 
features which illustrated in Table 8. After the output of this unit, the extracted features 
will be transmitted to the next unit, which is the attack assessment unit. The feature 
extraction process is discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.10. 











The difference of alpha1 and Alpha2 (AD) 
Total power of EEG signal 
ECG Features 
R-Peak (heart power) 
R-Peak to R-Peak Interval 
Heart rate variability 
4.5.4 Attack Assessment 
The attack assessment unit is responsible for distinguishing between normal and suspicious 
activities performed by the employee during his/her daily work. This unit uses the extracted 
features from EEG and ECG signals to assess whether the difference in features amounts 
to being classified as an internal attack. The attack assessment process is carried out using 
the employee’s bio-signals, which have been assembled during normal activities and stored 
for the purpose of comparison. So, the attack assessment unit also utilizes the stored 
features in the signal database (i.e., Unit 7 in Figure 11).   
The attack assessment unit distinguishes between normal and suspicious activities using 
supervised machine learning to monitor and direct the execution of a task, project, or 
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activity. Thus, the supervised machine-learning model is to teach the model or load the 
model with enough knowledge to predict decisions for future instances by training it with 
some labeled data. Therefore, the model can classify and predict the type of future data 
based on knowledge from the previous examples of labeled data. 
The supervised model reduces the time for analyzing the incoming data, classifying, and 
decision making as the process of training the model occurs only once. The classification 
algorithms used in this research are implemented using Java and WEKA API, where 
WEKA is an open-source software that contains a set of machine-learning algorithms for 
research purposes [128, 129]. The output results of this unit will be transmitted to the attack 
detector unit. The classification algorithms used in the experiments are presented and 
described in chapter 5, section 5.11. 
4.5.5 Comparative Signal Database 
This unit of the proposed system will contain samples of the human bio-signals collected 
from the organization’s employees during normal activities. The aim of this unit is to store 
the employees’ normal bio-signals to be compared with the collected bio-signals to detect 
the insider attack. The stored signals in this unit are already converted into features. These 
stored features play the role of the fingerprint for the employees’ physiological signals in 
the cases of normal activities. As explained in the previous section, this unit will be utilized 




4.5.6 Attack Detector 
The period of suspicious activity is very small compared to the time spent by the attacker 
in normal work. Moreover, an inside attacker, as any thief, will be keen not to be detected 
or tracked, so he will try to hide the trace of his malicious act by executing the attack in 
several stages at different times. The amount of suspicious incoming data will vary among 
attackers and among suspicious acts. Therefore, the amount of detected suspicious signals 
from the total incoming signals varies from person to person. The decision-making process 
must have a certain boundary or threshold. The attacker detector unit holds the threshold 
to judge if the incoming data is considered as an attack. The threshold will vary based on 
the type of protection; the lower the threshold, the higher the level of protection. The 
threshold is determined by the organization, depending on the nature of the organization’s 
work and security. When the organization aims at a safer system, it should use a low 
threshold level, which means that the proposed system will raise alarm and suspect harmful 
activities even with high error rate. 
4.6 Evaluating the Proposed System 
To address the fifth research objective, the potential of the proposed system to differentiate 
between normal and suspicious activities has been evaluated. Around eight evaluation 
criteria have been used to measure and summarize the quality and specify the efficiency of 
the proposed system from different points of view. 
For instance, the accuracy, recall and precision of the proposed system have been used to 
measure the ability of the system to discriminate between normal and malicious activities. 
The area under the ROC curve has been used to measure the ability of the proposed system 
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to achieve high accuracy in case the input data to the proposed system vary in size—i.e., 
the normal activity period varies from that of malicious activity. 
The evaluation of the proposed system was not limited to the use of different measurement 
criteria, but the system was evaluated using several classification algorithms. To 
demonstrate the quality of the extracted features from the bio-signals, three classification 
algorithms have been used, each algorithm with a different learning technique. Despite the 
type of algorithm used for building a model during the training and performance of each 
algorithm, extracting good features should give better results. The proposed system has 
proved that it can recognize malicious activity despite using different classification 
algorithms and the small malicious activity period compared to that of normal activity. 
Evaluating the results of the proposed approach is discussed in Chapter 6. 
4.7 Summary 
The methodology of this research has been divided into five stages, each stage intended to 
address one of the research objectives. The stages are the literature survey, the construction 
of the bio-signal data set, the feature extraction, a description of the proposed system, and 
the evaluation of the proposed system. A literature survey revealed considerable diversity 
in the methods of protection from insider threats. The outcome of the literature survey stage 
was the development of a categorization of the existing methods, as well as the discovery 
of the shortcomings of these methods, which played an important role in improving the 
proposed system. 
When collecting the bio-signals for the creation of the data set, some criteria were taken 
into consideration, such as collecting the bio-signals for a sufficient number of samples to 
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produce reliable results and developing the scenarios of insider threats to be as realistic as 
possible. Moreover, the feature extraction stage is an important stage intended to convert 
the collected signals into measurable characteristics that play a vital role in detecting 
malicious activity. 
Furthermore, in this chapter, the main units of the proposed system have been discussed: 
the sensors, the interfaces, the feature extractor, the attack assessment, the comparative 
data set, and the attack detector. The last stage of this research methodology—the 
evaluation of the proposed system—utilized several techniques to assess the potential of 
the proposed system for detecting insider threats. Examples of these techniques include 
using several metrics to assess the accuracy of the proposed system, evaluating the system 




5 CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENTAL WORK 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter mainly discusses in detail two stages of the research methodology: the 
construction of the bio-signal data set and the feature extraction (i.e., stages two and three 
in the research methodology). Also, this chapter partially deals with the proposed system 
(i.e., stage four of the research methodology), by presenting the machine learning 
algorithms used in the attack assessment unit. 
On the database construction stage, this chapter presents the experiments' preparation 
process as well as the experimental environment and discusses the experimental scenarios 
for collecting the human bio-signals. Also, this chapter presents the devices that are used 
for assembling the bio-signals and discusses components of the collected brainwaves and 
ECG signals, for instance Delta, Theta, Alpha Beta, Gamma, and the heart rate variability. 
On the other hand, this chapter discusses the feature extraction stage by illustrating the 
procedure of extracting the features from the collected bio-signals. In addition, it 
demonstrates the processes and equations that have been used in constructing the final 
feature-frame. Also, this chapter discusses the field of machine learning and presents the 




5.2 Experiment Setup 
The main objective of our experiments is to distinguish between insider threats and benign 
activities by utilizing bio-signals. To achieve this objective, the participants’ brain and 
ECG activities were recorded while they were performing two different scenarios: normal 
and malicious. The duration of each scenario is between eight to twelve minutes. The first 
scenario simulated the normal activities of the employee during his daily work. In contrast, 
the second scenario simulated as much as possible real insider threats performed by 
authenticated users who do not have any authorization to conduct such activities. To this 
end, during the second scenario, we sought to fulfill the following criteria: 
1. The participant is aware that his malicious work is not permitted and that he is 
responsible for any consequence of that work. 
2. The participant is the only person who has the decision to conduct malicious 
activity. 
3. The participants have a suitable environment for conducting malicious actions, but 
where they are not aware that their malicious acts are part of the experiments and 
are being monitored by the researcher. 
5.3 Experiment Environment 
The experiments were conducted at the campus of Hadhramout University, where the 
researcher works as a lecturer. The necessary approvals were obtained from the concerned 
authorities at Hadhramout University as well as the colleges that provided us with facilities 
for using their resources and their own labs to conduct these experiments. Moreover, in 
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order to conduct and record the malicious activities during the second scenario, the 
university offered the necessary facilities to obtain mock exams and fake documents with 
the collaboration of the subjects’ professors. 
To provide the appropriate environment, the experiments were conducted in a dedicated 
lab. Figure 14, shows the environment of the experimental lab. The participants sit alone 
in the lab, and the researcher monitors the computer's screen and recording the bio-signals 
while he was sitting in a separate room (i.e., Lab technician room). 
 
Figure 14: The Experimental Lab Environment 
5.4 Experiment Scenarios 
To simulate a realistic insider threat scenario, we tried to provide an appropriate 
environment that would attract the participants to perform a malicious activity without their 
knowledge that the attack was part of the experiment. To achieve this, in agreement with 
the colleges where the experiments were carried out, we announced fake goals for this 
experiment. It was announced that the main goal of this experiment was to develop 
software that would allow users to write on a computer using their bio-signals and brain 
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reactions without relying on a keyboard. The announcement claimed that bio-signals and 
brain reactions would be recorded while the participants were writing simple paragraphs 
using any word editor; the recordings would help the alleged software to distinguish the 
changes in bio-signals during the writing of each character or number. Moreover, the 
participants were notified that the experiment contained two scenarios. In the first scenario, 
the participants would write Arabic paragraphs, whereas in the second scenario, the 
participants would write English paragraphs. Moreover, the Arabic and English scenarios 
would take place on different days. 
Each time, the scenarios were conducted on a group of two participants. During the normal 
scenario, the bio-signals were collected from both participants. But during the malicious 
scenario, one participant (i.e., a fake participant) was hired by the researcher to play the 
role of a motivator as we would discuss in the following paragraphs. 
5.4.1 First Scenario: Normal Activities 
In this scenario, the participants were given some paragraphs written by hand in Arabic, 
which included some simple questions asking the participants to do the following tasks: 
1. Use any word editor to rewrite the given Arabic paragraphs. 
2. Answer the simple questions and write the results. 
3. Save the document in a specific folder on the server machine (the folder path was 
given). 
The bio-signals recorded during this scenario were stored in the data set as normal 
activities. This scenario included three regular office tasks: typing paragraphs, thinking 
93 
 
about solving problems, and using the organization’s network to save the document on the 
server. 
5.4.2 Second Scenario: Malicious Activities 
In the second session, the participants were asked to rewrite some paragraphs already 
written by hand in English, which included some simple questions requesting that the 
participants do the same tasks as in the first scenario. 
Prior to the second scenario, some extra folders were added to the server, exactly in the 
path where the participants would store their documents. These folders contained some 
fake private data that would pique the participants’ curiosity to read them or to copy these 
data from the remote server to the local machine or to their flash drives. Examples of the 
counterfeit data are exam models and solutions, lecturers’ private data, lists of staff salaries 
and allowances, and a list of candidates for bonuses. The variation in folders’ titles was 
intended to provoke the curiosity of participants of different ages covered by the 
experiments. All counterfeit data were obtained with the consent of the parties involved; 
for example, the old exams were obtained from the actual professors of the subjects.  
To make the participants spend a long time searching for the data, the folders did not 
contain the counterfeit data directly. The counterfeit data were saved in subfolders that 
were scattered in other subfolders. Moreover, in order to make the process of copying the 
entire folder to the local machine take a long time, the size of the subfolders that contained 
the fake data was increased by compressing these subfolders with additional large files. 
The goal of making the process of searching and copying the data quite long was to record 
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as many bio-signals as possible from the participants while they were doing such 
unauthorized activities.   
To ensure that the participants had observed the presence of the fake files, the fake 
participant who was hired by the researcher would play the role of a motivator, especially 
in the second malicious scenario. In case the real participant did not notice the existence of 
the files, the fake participant would pretend that he had discovered some important files on 
the server while he was storing the document. The real participant would be notified about 
the existence of the files cautiously and confidentially by the fake participant. The bio-data 
collected from the fake participant were ignored. To maintain the secrecy of the actual goal 
of the malicious scenario, it was conducted after completing the normal scenario, and the 
fake participant was asked to play the role of motivator only one day before conducting 
this scenario. The fraudulent participant was carefully chosen from the same age and 
academic level for the real participant. 
The second scenario simulated a real insider threat in which the user had authentication to 
access some files on the network, but he did not have any authorization to reach all folders, 
read the files, and copy private data. In addition, the user had the choice to conduct the 
malicious activity or to ignore the fake files. During the second scenario, the network 
devices were monitored using Net Monitor for Employee [130]. This software allowed the 
researcher to monitor the computer screens in the network, which helped to determine the 
time that the participant began to conduct malicious activities. When the real participant 
did not conduct any harmful activities, the collected bio-signals of that participant were 
ignored and were not stored in the data set as suspicious signals. 
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5.5 Bio-signals Data set 
The experiments were conducted on 172 participants. In the normal scenario, all 
participants’ bio-signals were collected. However, during the second scenario, only 84 
participants noticed the existence of the fake exams and decided to view or copy these files. 
These acts were considered malicious, so the bio-data of these 84 participants were stored 
in our data set and will be used as incoming data. Thus, the data set contains the bio-signals 
of only 84 participants, of whom 43 were male and 41 were female. All participants were 
in the range of 19 to 36 years old. 
5.6 Ethical Considerations 
The experiments were conducted with the approval of Hadhramout University, which 
provided such facilities as official letters to the colleges where the experiments were 
performed. Also, written permission was obtained from the colleges to carry out these 
experiments in their laboratories. Participating in the experiments was voluntary, where the 
participants had rights to attend the scenarios when they had free time. To maintain the 
secrecy of the second scenario, the real objective of the experiment was revealed to the 
participants after completing the entire experiment. Participants were informed about their 
right to participation and use their bio-signals for that objective. They were also informed 
that their personal data would be protected. The consent of 84 participants was obtained to 
use their bio-signals for research purposes. 
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5.7 Experiment Devices 
Two types of devices were used for collecting the EEG and ECG bio-signals: the NeuroSky 
MindWave and the Wild Divine. The devices have many advantages such as being small, 
wearable, easy to connect to a computer, comfortable, cheap, have several support 
programs, and having been used in several studies [131–133]. The NeuroSky transmits the 
signals wirelessly to the computer, whereas the Wild Divine uses the universal serial bus 
(USB) to connect with your computer. 
5.7.1 The NeuroSky MindWave 
The NeuroSky is a headset consisting of two sensors located on the forehead and earlobe. 
The NeuroSky monitors the brain activity; particularly those signals pertain to the attention. 
Unlike the medical EEG devices that use a paste or electrolyte gel to improve the contact 
between the scalp and the electrode, NeuroSky uses dry sensor technology which sensitive 
enough to pick up electrical activity without using the paste. [126]. Figure 15 illustrates the 
NeuroSky headset. 
 
Figure 15: NeuroSky MindWave Headset 
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To improve EEG clarity, the device collects EEG brainwaves by calculating the potential 
difference between the forehead and the ear electrodes. The reference electrode was chosen 
in the earlobe because there's none EEG activity in the earlobe; which leads to calculate 
the voltage difference between accurately [126]. 
5.7.2 Wild Divine 
The Wild Divine device is a biofeedback component that can measure human biological 
data from the autonomic nervous system, which responds to a person’s inner world of 
thought, perception, and indicators of positive emotions, like excitement, and negative 
ones, like nervousness. The Wild Divine device has three finger rings, as illustrated in 
Figure 16.  To measure human bio-signals, three fingers, i.e., ring, middle, and index, are 
inserted into the rings. The middle ring measures HRV, whereas the other two rings 
measure the skin conductance level [134]. 
 
 
Figure 16: The Wild Divine Device 
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5.8 Brain Waves 
5.8.1 An Electroencephalogram (EEG) 
The human brain consists of billions of neurons which emit electrical impulses to 
communicate with each other. The changes of electrical impulses are represented in the 
form of brainwaves that are strong enough to be recorded by using electrodes on the scalp 
with a technique called electroencephalography (EEG) [135]. Researchers have made 
considerable strides to link the brainwaves with memory, consciousness and even certain 
diseases such as Epilepsy [136–138]. 
5.8.2 Brainwaves: Types and Functions 
Brainwaves have different patterns based on their frequencies and amplitudes. The 
frequency of a brainwave is directly proportional to the number of times that neurons are 
firing per second, whereas the amplitude is directly proportional to the number of neurons 
fired synchronously. There are five types of brainwave patterns, namely Delta, Theta, 
Alpha, Beta and Gamma [139, 140]. Figure 17 illustrates the frequency spectrum of normal 
EEG signals. 
5.8.2.1 Delta Brainwaves 
Delta brainwaves have the frequency range of (0.5 to 4 Hertz), which is the lowest 
frequency among the different types. It has relatively high amplitudes in the range of (75 
− 200μV). Delta activities are typically linked to a deep sleep or unconscious state and are 
predominantly found in human beings who hold a strong sense of empathy and intuition. 
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Moreover, Delta brainwaves allow us to access subconscious activity if generated in the 
waking state [141, 142]. 
5.8.2.2 Theta Brainwaves 
Theta waves are slightly higher in frequency than Delta waves. Theta waves travel between 
neurons in the frequency range of 4 to 8 Hertz. They are often associated with the 
meditative or deep relaxation state of consciousness. The deeper the meditation, the higher 
the creativity and the faster the learning displayed by a person. Theta activities increase in 
the daydreaming state when a person dreams consciously or is in a light sleep. They are 
linked with highly monotonous daily tasks such as walking on the same road, wearing 
clothes and combing hair [142]. 
5.8.2.3 Alpha Brainwaves 
Alpha waves are formed when neurons fire signals at frequency ranges of (8 to 13 Hz), 
which is faster than in the case of Theta waves. The typical amplitude of Alpha waves is 
around (50μV peak-peak). Alpha waves are usually dominant in normal situations, 
especially with closed eyes, and in the relaxed but wakeful state. On the other hand, Alpha 
waves are attenuated when the eyes are open and when a mental effort is required to solve 
difficult problems [135, 142]. 
5.8.2.4 Beta Brainwaves 
Beta waves travel between neurons at frequency ranges of 13 to 30 Hertz. Beta waves are 
dominant with the state of awareness, concentration and the active state of wakefulness 
when the eyes are open. Beta activities are associated with a state of increased alertness 
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and a focus on the task at hand. Furthermore, when Beta activity increases, the brain is 
working efficiently and can develop new ideas and generate solutions [141, 142]. 
5.8.2.5 Gamma Brainwaves 
Gamma waves have the highest frequency compared with the rest of brainwaves. Gamma 
waves travel between brain neurons in the frequency of more than 30 Hertz. Gamma waves 
are associated with the high energy moments, the concentration and focus. Moreover, 
Gamma waves are linked to language processing, memory, and regional learning [142].   
It is worth mentioning that, always the five brainwaves are generated together. However, 
when one of the brainwaves dominates, it means that the other brainwaves are weak but 
still can be distinguished. Thus, the strength of the brainwave is related to the activity type 
and a state of the person [143]. 
 
Figure 17: Frequency Spectrum of Normal EEG 
5.9 An Electrocardiogram (ECG) 
The human heart is capable of generating electrical signals, which it uses to create the 
muscular contractions that are needed to move the blood through the body’s blood vessels. 
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In fact, physicians can study and analyze the way that the heart produces electrical signals 
and determine different types of abnormalities that might exist within the heart simply by 
using a tool known as an electrocardiogram (ECG). An electrocardiogram measures the 
electrical signal generated by the heart. ECG is not a tracing of a single action potential but 
an amalgamation of the many action potentials that constitute the electrical activity of the 
heart [144, 145]. 
5.9.1 Types of ECG Wave Components 
In this research, three components are extracted from the ECG wave to be used in the 
proposed system: heart rate variability, R peaks, and the interval between R peaks. 
5.9.1.1 Heart Rate Variability HRV 
Heart rate is controlled by the balance of sympathetic and parasympathetic of the 
autonomic nervous system. Heart rate variability HRV is the variation of heart period or 
inter-beat interval. It is the time between successive R peaks in the electrocardiogram as 
illustrated in  Figure 18. HRV is measured by calculating the standard deviation (SDNN) 
of all normal to normal inter-beat intervals (i.e., all normal R to R intervals) [146]. 
 
Figure 18: R Peak To R Peak Interval of ECG [147] 
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Heart rate variability is used as an indicator of mental workload. Moreover, it can be used 
as a measure of emotional response to certain stimuli. Clinical research has proved that the 
heart rate variability HRV level becomes low when a person experiences high stress, 
whereas the increases in HRV level is an indication of a high resilience. Figure 19, shows 
low and high HRV [148]. 
 
Figure 19: Heart Rate Variability (HRV) [149] 
5.9.1.2 R Peak (Heart Power) 
The electrocardiogram R wave which is denoted by QRS complex in Figure 18, is used in 
the analysis of the irregularities of heart rhythm. Furthermore, the R wave has a vital role 
in determining HRV. The R wave is a positive deflection upwards that represents 
depolarization of the left ventricle and myocardium. The maximum amplitude in the R 
wave is known as R peak. R peak is measured in millivolts [150, 151]. 
5.9.1.3 R to R Interval 
The R–R interval represents the interval between two consecutive R peaks, i.e., the interval 
between two heartbeats. The R–R interval is an important component to differentiate 
between malicious and normal activities. We can assume that the heart rate is affected when 
a person conducts malicious activities, and the R–R interval is a good indicator of the 
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amount the heart rate is increasing. The R–R interval is used to calculate the heart rate in 
beats per minute by multiplying by 60 the invert number of R–R interval per second [144]. 
Figure 18, illustrates the R-R interval. 
5.10 Feature Extraction 
Features are the characteristics of signals that have the primary role in identifying the major 
changes these signals. Features will increase the effectivity of the raw signals for 
distinguishing the malicious activities [152]. This section discusses Feature Extraction 
which is the third stage of the research methodology (Chapter 4, Figure 7). It presents the 
signals' preprocessing, the procedures of extracting features from the raw signals, and the 
equations used for converting the raw signals into features. Moreover, this section presents 
the process of producing the final feature-frame that used by the proposed system to detect 
the malicious activities. Figure 20 illustrates the main diagram of the features extraction 
procedures; starting with collecting of raw signals to the process of configuring the final 
feature-frame. 
5.10.1 Signal Preprocessing 
The preprocessing is taking place by two units of the proposed system, the sensors and 
interfaces. The sensors collect several signals, separate them, and send these signals to the 
interfaces. The interfaces recorded the received signals and utilizing these signals for 
calculating additional parameters.  
The device collects EEG brainwaves by calculating the potential difference between the 
forehead and the ear electrodes. The signals are amplified by the device 8,000 times in 
order to improve the faint EEG waves. Moreover, the EEG signals are filtered using low- 
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and high-pass filters to correct any possible distortion. Then, the standard fast Fourier 
transform (FFT) is performed on the filtered signals to convert them to the frequency 
domain, i.e., EEG bands [126]. 
On the other hand, The ECG signals are processed and converted from analog to digital 
signals in the ECG sensor (i.e. Wild Divine device). The device extracts the main 
components of the signal such as heart rate, the peak of ECG wave and the intervals 
between peaks [134]. Then those components are sent to the ECG interface to be recorded 
and utilized for calculating additional features such as the intervals between signals, and 
HRV heart rate variability. 
 
Figure 20: The Main Diagram of The Features Extraction Process 
5.10.2 EEG Features 
The proposed EEG features are based on three factors which are: dividing the EEG waves 
into smaller ranges to extract features, Normalizing the features and extract additional 
features from the influential EEG waves. 
Calculating total power 
and extra features 
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Calculating SDNN, 


















5.10.2.1 Small Ranges of EEG Waves 
The NeuroSky device sends the brainwaves' power in the form of sessions of one-second 
duration. In this research, the frequency ranges of brainwaves were divided into smaller 
bands as illustrated in Table 9. Since the proposed approach uses machine learning 
techniques to detect malicious activities, dividing the brainwaves into smaller frequency 
bands would increase the number of features used in the detection. Moreover, although the 
brainwaves would not have the same impact on the results, using smaller frequency bands 
allows for an extensive study of each part of the brainwave and its impact on the detection 
of internal threats. 
Table 9: Frequency Ranges of EEG Bands 
EEG Band Frequency Range 
Delta 1-3 Hz 
Theta 4-7 Hz 
Alpha1 8-9 Hz 
Alpha2 10-12 Hz 
Beta1 13-17 Hz 
Beta2 18-30 Hz 
Gamma1 31-40 Hz 
Gamma2 41-50 Hz 
5.10.2.2 Normalization 
In the normalization stage, we normalized each EEG component (i.e., Delta, Theta, Alpha1, 
Alpha2, Beta1, Beta2, Gamma1, and Gamma2) in a single session using Equation 5.1. 
Normalizing the power of EEG bands has two major advantages to the efficiency of the 
extracted features [153]; which are: 
1. Reduce the impact of the signal variability. 
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2. Allow the proposed features to distinguish between the active and idle EEG 




                                           (5.1) 
NWx,i: Normalized EEG component x in session i. 
totpwri: the total power of session i. 
5.10.2.3 Calculating Additional Features 
Two more features were calculated during this stage: the total power and the alpha 
difference (AD). The total power (totpwr) of each EEG session is the summation of the 
power of the eight components in that session. Unlike the normalized EEG signals, which 
can facilitate comparison among the EEG components, the total power provides an 
opportunity to study the overall change in the EEG signals by comparing the total power 
of signals during both malicious and normal scenarios. Equation 5.2 demonstrates the 
calculation of total power. 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑝𝑤𝑟𝑖 = ∑ 𝑤𝑥
8
𝑥=1                                           (5.2) 
i: the frame number. 
x: the brainwave number. 
w: the brainwave power. 
Moreover, Alpha wave plays an important role in determining the transition of a person's 
condition from the relaxing or calm state to the thinking and concentration state [141, 154]. 
The concentration level of the participant will change when conducting the unauthorized 
actions. So, Alpha wave can provide more information when the participant starts the 
harmful activities. Therefore, we studied the effect of the Alpha difference (AD) in the 
training and testing data. From the collected bio-signals, we found the percent change of 
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Alpha difference increased by around 46.6% more than Alpha1 in the training and testing 
data, and it increased by around 66% more than Alpha2. So, using AD as an additional 
feature would improve the accuracy of the proposed system. The AD and the percent 
change illustrated in Equations 5.3 and 5.4. 
𝐴𝐷 = |𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎2 − 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎1|                                               (5.3) 




× 100%                            (5.4) 
5.10.3 ECG Features 
In this research, three features were extracted from the ECG waves: The R peak, the R–R 
interval, and heart rate variability. The R peak is the maximum amplitude of the 
electrocardiogram (ECG) signal, whereas the term interval refers to the time difference 
between the consecutive R peaks [144]. Moreover, heart rate variability, or SDNN, is the 
standard variation of heart period, which is calculated using Equation 5.5. It is worth 
mentioning that the ECG interface calculates the value of SDNN once every minute. 
Therefore, every 60 seconds, the application calculates the standard deviation of the 




∑ (𝑅𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅)
2
𝑁
𝑖=2                                           (5.5) 
RRi: denotes the time from ith to the i+1st R peak. 
RR: the average interval. 
N: intervals in total. 
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5.10.4 Feature Frame 
The final feature frame consists of a combination of the EEG and the ECG feature frames. 
The EEG feature frame contains 10 features, which are illustrated in Figure 21. Only the 
total power (totpwr) is not normalized, whereas the other nine features are normalized. 
Delta Theta Alpha1 Alpha2 Beta1 Beta2 Gamma1 Gamma2 AD totpwr 
  
Normalized  
Figure 21: EEG Feature Frame 
On the other hand, the ECG feature frame consists of three features: R peak, interval, and 
SDNN. The class field contains the label that is used to train the machine learning 
algorithm. The label or the class determines the type of frame that has been extracted from 
either the normal or the suspicious activities. Figure 22, illustrates the final feature frame. 




Figure 22: Feature Frame 
R peak: the maximum amplitude of ECG R peak in second. 
Interval: the time between R to R peaks.  
SDNN: standard deviation of all R to R intervals. 
5.11 Machine Learning  
Machine learning is an area of computing that is improving the ability of the computer 
systems to learn from past experience. Tom M. Mitchell, who is a professor at Carnegie 
Mellon University, defined the machine learning as: 
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"A computer program is said to learn from experience E with respect to some class of 
tasks T and performance measure P if its performance at tasks in T, as measured by P, 
improves with experience E." [155] 
In other words, the computer program has learned when it utilizes past experience to 
improve how it performs a particular task. A machine learning program is fairly different 
compared to a normal computer program, because in the normal computer program, all the 
data and the parameters needed to perform a certain task have already been defined by its 
programmer. 
Based on the learning technique, the field of machine learning can be divided into 
categories: supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning [156]. Supervised 
learning is where the machine is trained and taught using labeled data, i.e., tagged data with 
the correct answer, to utilize this past experience to give an outcome for new, previously 
unseen data. Examples of supervised learning are classification and regression. On the 
other hand, unsupervised learning is where the machine is trained with unlabeled or 
untagged data to draw inferences and create a model for the data set. Examples of 
unsupervised learning are clustering and frequent-patterns. The third category of machine 
learning is reinforcement learning, which deals with how the software agents can maximize 
some concept of cumulative reward by taking necessary actions in a specific environment. 
For example, a game agent can utilize cumulative effect in order to create a winning 
strategy by playing the game many times [22, 157].  
Detecting the attacker from inside organizations, which is the main problem of this 
research, tends to be a classification problem, where the machine should classify the 
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incoming data as malicious or normal. Therefore, in this research, supervised learning will 
be utilized where the machine will be trained using labeled data with correct answers to 
teach the machine how to classify new, previously unseen data. In this research, three 
classification algorithms were used: Random Forest, Support Vector Machine and Neural 
Network. Each algorithm has its technique of learning from labeled data. 
5.11.1 Random Forest 
The Random Forest (RF) method uses a random selection of data and a random selection 
of variables to create many decision trees. The random selection of data leads to the 
creation of several subsets of data that have different sizes and may have overlapped data, 
so the sizes of the decision trees will be random. On the other hand, the random selection 
of variables or features leads to the creation of decision trees with a different number of 
variables [158]. So, the RF technique consists of many decision trees. The idea behind the 
correctness of the RF method is that the huge number of trees leads to a better prediction 
because of the following: 
1. The decision tree is usually correct, but it may have some parts of the data which 
are incorrect. 
2. The huge number of decision trees will never have the same incorrect parts of data. 
It worth to mention that each decision tree will classify the new incoming data and vote for 
this classification. The RF will choose the classification that has the most votes over all the 
other trees. Figure 23 the RF procedures for selecting data and variables, and voting for the 
results. From the Figure, it can be noted that the sizes of the selected data and the number 
of variables is varied. This variation leads to creating decision trees of different sizes. Also, 
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we can notice that the number of decision trees which vote for the suspicious activity is 
more than the trees which vote for the normal activity; in this case, the incoming signals 
will be classified as suspicious [158, 159]. 
 
Figure 23: Random Forest Procedures 
5.11.2 Support Vector Machine 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) uses support vectors to draw the decision boundary 
(hyperplane) to segregate the classes of data. The best hyperplane is one that leaves the 
































Voting for Results 
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where the SVM basically implies that only these extreme points in the data set distinguish 
between different classes, whereas the other training examples are ignored [160, 161]. 
The SVM algorithm segregates the classes of data by drawing the decision boundary or a 
hyperplane. The best hyperplane is the one that leaves the maximum margin from the 
classes of data. Therefore, the SVM algorithm uses the support vectors which are the 
extremes of the data sets to draw the hyperplane. The SVM algorithm implies that only 
these extreme points in the data set distinguish between different classes, whereas the other 
training examples are ignored. Figure 24 illustrates the process of selecting the best 
hyperplane. This Figure shows how the SVM algorithm segregates between two classes, 
which are the black and white squares [160].  
From Figure 24, the SVM selects the extreme points of the classes, i.e., the extreme 
elements of white and black squares, to draw the hyperplanes. Also, it can be noticed from 
the same Figure that the margin Z2 of the second hyperplane H2 is wider than the margin 
Z1 of the hyperplane H1. Therefore, the second hyperplane H2 can distinguish between the 
classes of data better than the first hyperplane H1. 
 
Figure 24: Selecting The Best Hyperplane 
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5.11.3 Neural Network 
The principle of neural networks lies in trying to emulate how the human brain works. A 
neural network is made up of several nodes, which are called neurons. The connections 
between these neurons are called synapses. So, information is passed between neural 
network nodes via the synapses. When a neural network node receives information, it can 
process it and transmit it to the connected nodes. The connections or synapses have values 
that represent their weights. The higher the weight of the connection, the more important 
the information of that connection. Therefore, when a node is stimulated by several nodes, 
it can decide which node is more important [162, 163].  
The neural network consists of several layers of nodes, where the information travels from 
the input layer to the output layer of the network. The layers between the input and output 
layers are called the hidden layers. Figure 25, illustrates the structure of neural network.  
Each node of the neural network judges its input and sets its value using a transfer function, 
which is a simple math equation that allows the node to accept or reject the triggers. The 
transfer function produces a combination value from the trigger value and the current value 
of the node [162, 164].  
The neural network learns through a process called backpropagation. The network starts 
with random connection weights, then calculates a set of outputs for a given set of inputs. 
These outputs are compared with the desired output, but because the network starts with 
random connections, there will be an error, or a difference between the outputs. So, the 
neural network will adjust the connection weights to reduce the error. This process is 
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known as backpropagation. In it, the output nodes tell the nodes in the previous layers about 
the error and try together to adjust their connection weights to reduce the output error [165]. 
 
Figure 25: Neural Network Structure 
5.12 Summary 
Collecting the human bio-signals are essential in two phases of this research: Building the 
bio-signals data set and feature extraction. So, two experimental scenarios have been 
developed to collect the bio-signals from volunteers during the normal and suspicious 
activities. The proposed scenarios aimed at creating a realistic environment for the normal 
and insider threats where the volunteers have the decision to conduct the malicious activity 
without knowing that their malicious activities are part of the experiment. 
Moreover, the procedure of feature extraction from the collected human bio-signals have 
been illustrated in this chapter, including presenting the EEG and ECG signals, 























equations that have been used in extracting the features. The extracted features have been 
illustrated in the form of a frame, which contains both EEG and ECG features. The feature 
frame contains ten EEG features and three ECG features, in addition to a class filed which 
was used as a label for the machine learning. 
Since the classification is a crucial phase in the proposed system for distinguishing between 
the insider threats and normal activities, three machine learning algorithms that have been 
used to evaluate the proposed system, these algorithms are the random forest, the support 
vector machine, and the back propagation neural network. Each of these algorithms has its 
learning method and model. Using several machine learning algorithms is intended to 




6 CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS AND EVALUATION 
6.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the research hypotheses and the procedures to address them. 
Moreover, it discusses the results and efficiency of the proposed system using several 
metrics. Selecting those metrics takes into account the evaluation of the proposed system 
from various aspects such as the accuracy of detecting the insider attacks, and to what 
extent this accuracy is correct. 
Also, this chapter deliberates the feasibility of using only the brainwaves to identify the 
insider threats, where the accuracy of the proposed system would be examined using only 
the EEG features. Furthermore, it clarifies the most influential features on the results. 
Moreover, this chapter discusses the performance of the proposed system to detect 
malicious threats by using three of the machine learning classification algorithms. The aim 
of using different algorithms to illustrate that the results are not affected by the models and 
learning methods of several machine learning techniques. 
6.2 Hypotheses 
To address the main research problem, detecting insider threats using human bio-signals, 
the proposed approach will be evaluated by assessing its ability to distinguish between 
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normal and malicious activities. To achieve this goal, the following main null hypothesis 
has been developed: 
H0) The proposed approach has no potential to distinguish between the normal and 
malicious activities by using human bio-signals; thus, it is not able to detect the insider 
attackers. 
In order to address the main null hypothesis, the following support hypotheses have been 
developed: 
H0-1) The extracted features from the brainwaves (EEG signals) have no potential to 
detect an insider attacker by differentiating between normal and suspicious activities. 
To address the hypothesis H0-1, we have generated only the EEG features frame, which is 
illustrated in Figure 21. Then, using machine learning techniques, the extracted EEG 
features have been tested for their ability and efficiency to distinguish between the two 
experimental scenarios, i.e., malicious and normal activities.  
H0-2) The extracted features from the electrocardiogram (ECG) signals have no potential 
to detect an insider attacker by differentiating between normal and suspicious activities. 
To address the second null hypothesis H0-2, we have generated the full features frame (i.e., 
the frame that contains both EEG and ECG features), as illustrated in Figure 22. Then, 
utilizing machine learning techniques, the extracted features (i.e., ECG and EEG together) 
have been tested for their ability and efficiency to distinguish between the two experimental 
scenarios. Moreover, in order to study the effect of the ECG features on the results, the 
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results using the full frame have been compared with the EEG frame results. The full frame 
will be abbreviated as EEG+ECG. 
To determine the results’ significance, and to test the validity of the null hypotheses, the 
Paired t-Test has been used [166, 167]. The t-Test uses when the observation on the two 
populations are collected in pairs. The following expression has been used to test the 
validity of the main null hypothesis using the Paired t-Test: 
𝑡0 = ?̅?/(𝑆/√𝑛)                                           (6.1) 
?̅? and S are the sample average and standard deviation of the difference. 𝑛: Sample number. 
The one tail t-Test was used with significance value α: =1% as illustrated in Figure 26. So, 
the null hypothesis will be rejected if the t-Test is in the rejection area. 
 
Figure 26: One Tail t-Test 
6.3 Evaluation Metrics 
Evaluation metrics play a vital role in assessing the performance and efficiency of the 
proposed system for distinguishing between benign and malignant bio-signals. Therefore, 
several metrics have been used each of which evaluates the system for different objectives. 
Since the research problem—identifying the malicious activities—is a classification 
problem, the confusion matrix is utilized. The confusion matrix is a technique that 
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evaluates the performance of the classification model and illustrates the errors of the 
classification problem by summarizing the prediction results. The confusion matrix of the 
binary classification problem that distinguishes between two different groups is 
represented by a 2-by-2 matrix [166] as illustrated in Table 10. Also, the confusion matrix 
plays an important role in deriving several of the following evaluation metrics. 




Negative TN FP 
Positive FN TP 
 
True Negative (TN): TN are negative cases that are correctly predicted to be negative 
[166]. In this research, TN represents the bio-signals that are collected during a first 
scenario while the participants are doing a regular activity, which is correctly predicted by 
the classifier as a regular activity. 
True Positive (TP): TP are positive cases that are correctly predicted to be positive [166]. 
TP represents the bio-signals that are collected during a second scenario (suspicious 
activity), which is correctly predicted as a suspicious activity.  
False Negative (FN): FN are positive cases that are incorrectly predicted to be negative 
[166]. FN represents the bio-signals that are collected during a suspicious activity, which 
is incorrectly predicted as a regular activity.  
False Positive (FP): FP are negative cases that are incorrectly predicted to be positive 
[166]. FP represents the bio-signals that are collected during a regular activity, which is 




Accuracy is the ratio of correctly classified bio-signals (TP and TN) to the total number of 
bio-signals collected from the participant. It Indicates the degree of conformity and 
correctness of the results obtained when compared to the true value [166]. The accuracy is 










                                    (6.2) 
Given that the accuracy metric has limitations when used with unbalanced data (i.e., 
usually, the number of normal frames is greater than the number of malicious frames) 
[166]. For example, negative (normal) cases account for 9850 frames of data, whereas 
positive (suspicious) cases account for only 150 frames of the data. If the classifier always 
predicts the majority class (i.e., predicts all the data as TN), the accuracy will equal 98.5%. 
However, the classifier did not ever predict any of the TP (suspicious). So, accuracy may 
not be a good measurement when the data has unbalanced classes. To ensure that classifier 
performance is correct when using the proposed features, several support metrics are used. 
6.3.2 Precision 
Precision is the proportion of correct positive prediction (true positive) to the total 
classified positive cases. Precision is a way of describing how multiple measurements are 
close to each other. It ensures that the test shows the same results when repeated several 
times under stable conditions. High precision leads to fewer false positive cases [166]. In 










                                          (6.3) 
6.3.3 Recall 
Recall is the proportion of correct positive classification (true positive) to the total actual 
positive cases. Recall measures the true positive rate. High recall leads to fewer false 







                                           (6.4) 
6.3.4 F-score 
F-score or F-measure is a metric that returns a value between zero and one and utilized to 
assess the usefulness of the classification technique. The higher the F-score, the better the 
prediction of the classifier. F-score is the harmonic mean for the recall and precision [166, 








= 2 ×  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛+𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
                                           (6.5) 
6.3.5 Area Under the Curve AUC 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is commonly used with Area Under the 
Curve (AUC), to evaluate the binary classification that is the classification of two classes. 
ROC curve summarizes the performance of the binary classifier by plotting the correctly 
classified instances, the True-Positive rate against the False-Positive rate. The 
misclassification rate is a type of simple classification measure, which visualizes the error 
rate for the single threshold. ROC curve has several advantages over this as it deals with 
all possible classification thresholds when representing the error rate. The AUC, which is 
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just the percentage of area that is under the ROC curve is an effective metric with data sets. 
This is the case even when the classes are highly unbalanced [166, 169]. 
6.3.6 Kappa 
The performance of the classifier, which is the ‘Observed Accuracy’ can be compared with 
the possibility of achieving this performance by random chance, also called ‘Expected 
Accuracy’. The chance-corrected metric that is utilized for this comparison and assessment 
is ‘Kappa’. The Kappa score is directly proportional to the difference between the 
accuracies. So, we can say that a model will have a high Kappa score if there is a big 
difference between the observed accuracy and the expected accuracy. As Kappa considers 
random change in its calculation, it is more reliable than using the accuracy [170, 171]. 
Kappa is calculated using the following equations: 
𝑘𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎 =
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦−𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 
1−𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦
                                           (6.6) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
𝐸𝑥𝑝 𝐴𝑐𝑐 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙+𝐸𝑥𝑝 𝐴𝑐𝑐 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠
𝑛
                                   (6.7) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝 𝐴𝑐𝑐 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 =
(𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑃)∗(𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑁) 
𝑛
                                            (6.8) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝 𝐴𝑐𝑐 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 =
(𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃)∗(𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁) 
𝑛
                                            (6.9) 
Observed Accuracy: Instances classified correctly. 
Expected Accuracy: Expected accuracy by any random classifier. 
n: Number of instances in the data. 
6.3.7 Matthews Correlation Coefficient 
B.W. Matthews had developed the Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC), a type of 
machine learning metrics used to assess the quality of the binary classifiers [172, 173].  
Biomedical research widely makes use of MCC and it has been selected as one of the 
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elective metrics in the US FDA-led initiative, MAQC-II [174]. MCC is also suitable to 
assess the binary classifier when dealing with data that is imbalanced that means classes of 
different sizes of data. The coefficients are returned between -1 to 1 by using MCC. The 




                                 (6.10) 
6.3.8 Percent Difference 
To compare two experimental results when both results are obtained using different 
approaches, the Percent Error or Percent Difference (PD) is usually used. When the value 
is equal to zero or when the two values have a big difference, the maximum PD will never 
be higher than 200% [175]. Percent Error is calculated using Equation 6.11. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑃𝐷) = |
1𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒−2𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
(1𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒+2𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)/2
|                            (6.11) 
6.3.9 Cross-Validation 
The k folds cross-validation is an evaluation technique for the machine learning predictive 
model. The cross-validation separates the data into k equal-size subsets. One of these 
subsets is used to test the machine learning model, whereas the k-1 is used to train the 
model. The k folds cross-validation repeats the learning algorithm k times, and then the 
average performance of the k different testing subsets is calculated [166]. In this research 
10 folds cross-validation is used. 
6.3.10 Confidence Interval 
To ensure that the achieved results for the proposed approach are correct, and to describe 
the uncertainty in the estimates, the 95% confidence interval of the accuracy that achieved 
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by the classifiers has calculated. The confidence interval of the results was calculated as 
following: 






               (6.13) 





2 − 𝑛?̅?2𝑘𝑖=1 ]   (6.15) 
Where ?̅? is the mean, E is the error, n is the number of participants, 𝑧𝛼
2
  is a constant, 𝜎 is 
a standard deviation, S2 is the variance, while f is the frequency of participants in each 
range and x is the midpoint of each range. 
6.4 Hypotheses Testing and Validity 
We validate the null hypotheses by evaluating the proposed system and the extracted 
features using the following procedures. First, the accuracy of EEG features is presented 
to assess hypothesis H0-1. Then, the accuracy of the proposed EEG+ECG method is 
discussed and compared with the EEG method to test hypothesis H0-2 and illustrate the 
impact of adding ECG features on results. Validation of the research hypotheses using the 
accuracy metric does not provide high credibility, given that the accuracy metric has 
limitations when used with unbalanced data (i.e., usually, the number of normal frames is 
greater than the number of malicious frames). Therefore, additional support metrics 
mentioned in section 6.3 have been used to assess the correctness of the accuracy metric. 




Figure 27: Testing The Validity of The Null Hypotheses 
6.5 Presenting Results 
Bio-data were collected for 84 participants during both scenarios (normal and suspicious). 
In order to illustrate the results for this large number of participants, the results will be 
presented in the form of a histogram. Histograms provide a visual display of vast amounts 
of data that are hard to understand in a tabular format. The values of each metric (ex. 
accuracy) are divided into ranges, which are used as the histogram ranges. Each range is 
determined by the highest and lowest values of the range. The histogram separates the 
results into groups, each of which contains the number of participants that fall within the 
same range of the histogram and thus, the same range boundaries of the metric.  
Figure 28 shows an example of the results presentation. From the figure, the X and Y axis 
of the graph shows the metric's ranges and the number of participants, respectively. Clearly, 
the figure illustrates the results of 66 participants fall within the range of 90–100% of the 
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100% when using the specified metric. Moreover, in our experiments, no volunteers fall in 
the range from zero to 50%. Therefore, ranges with low values are ignored to abbreviate 
the empty results.  
In addition to the histogram results, the results of each participant will be presented in 
scatter graph. Unlike the histogram that represents a range of accuracy values, each point 
in the scatter graph represents only one value of accuracy and the number of participants 
achieved that value of accuracy.  
Moreover, evaluating each frame of incoming data individually to distinguish insider 
threats would keep the system busy all the time and waste the resources of the device 
containing the proposed system. Therefore, the average of each five feature-frames is 
calculated and packaged as a single frame. So, instead of evaluating each frame, a group 
of frames will be evaluated by converting them into a single frame as shown in Figure 29. 
Moreover, the average of ten and the average of fifteen feature-frames will be tested to 
illustrate if there is a degradation in the quality of the detection when the multiple frames 
compressed together. 
 



























Figure 29: Generating a Group of Frames 
6.6 Results of EEG Features 
This section justifies accepting or rejecting research hypothesis H0-1. To this end, the 
results of using only the EEG features are presented and discussed. Moreover, the proposed 
EEG approach is compared with different feature-frames illustrated in Figure 30 to 
demonstrate the effect of each factor of the EEG feature-frame (i.e., using small ranges, 
normalization, and additional features). The results are compared with the raw EEG waves 
(i.e., Figure 30, frame d) in detail, to assess the effectiveness of the extracted features. The 
accuracy metric is used as a reference to evaluate the validity of H0-1 because accuracy 
describes how the results of the proposed approach are close to the true results. However, 
due to the accuracy limitations when used with unbalanced data as in this research, the 
other metrics mentioned earlier in this chapter were used to support and measure the 
correctness of the reference metric. 
Group of frames X 
Group  X+1 







Figure 31 illustrates the classification accuracy of the proposed EEG approach using the 
Random Forest (RF) classifier. The figure shows that most of the participants are correctly 
classified, with an accuracy of more than 90%. In other words, the classifier can 
differentiate between normal and malicious activities for those cases with an error less than 
10%. On the other hand, accuracy is lower than this for 17 participants. To investigate these 
results further, Figure 32 illustrates more details about the accuracy of the proposed 
approach. The figure shows the distribution of classification accuracy of the range 90–
100% in more detail. The classifier can detect malicious activities in 44 cases with an 
accuracy of more than 98%, which indicates the efficiency of the proposed approach for 
identifying such threats. 
 
Figure 30: Features for Comparison 
d. Raw EEG waves 
a. Normalized small ranges 
b. Not normalized small ranges 






Figure 31: Classification Accuracy using RF  Figure 32: Accuracy of Proposed Approach in Detail 
The timeframe of suspicious activity is always very small compared to the time spent by 
the insider attacker in normal work. Like any thief, an insider attacker will be keen not to 
be detected or tracked. He will try to hide the traces of his malicious acts by executing the 
attack in several stages at different times. So, the amount of suspicious incoming data will 
vary between attackers and between suspicious acts. Therefore, the number of the detected 
suspicious signals among the total incoming signals varies from one person to another, 
resulting in different detection accuracy. 
The attribute selection method was used to illustrate the effect of the alpha difference AD 
factor on the results. During the classification of data, the classifier may rely on some 
features (trusted or selected features) more than others. These trusted features have a 
significant impact on the results. Thus, the classifier can obtain almost the same 
classification results using only the trusted features. The procedure of selecting the trusted 
features is called the attribute selection method. In this research, the supervised attribute 
selection is implemented using Weka API with Java code [128, 129]. The supervised 
attribute selection requires a search algorithm and an evaluation method. The 
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evaluation respectively. The WrapperSubsetEval generates all possible subsets of features 
and uses an induction algorithm to select the subset of features that achieved the highest 
evaluation [178]. Figure 33 shows the impact of each feature on the results of the proposed 
approach. The figure shows that AD was one of the most influential features in more than 
half of the classification cases, because the concentration level of the participant will 
change when conducting the unauthorized actions as well as the AD level. 
 
Figure 33: Impact of Features on the Results 
Furthermore, to demonstrate that the addition of the AD factor increased the accuracy of 
detecting insider threats, Figure 34 illustrates the accuracy comparison of the proposed 
approach with and without using the AD factor. The figure shows that there is a significant 
increase in cases detected with accuracy greater than 90% when adding the AD factor to 
the proposed approach. The number of malicious cases discovered by the classifier 
increased by around 55.8% with accuracy above 90% when using the AD factor. Moreover, 
Figure 35 illustrates the effect of AD factor in for each participant using scatter chart. Each 

























Figure 34: Effect of AD Factor 
 
Figure 35: Effect of AD Factor in Details 
In order to clarify the effect of using small frequency bands and feature normalization, we 
compare the proposed EEG feature-frame with the feature-frames in Figure 30 (i.e., a, b, 
and c). Figure 36 illustrates that the normalized frame with small frequency ranges 
achieved better results than the normalized frame with large ranges. Using small ranges, 
the classifier detected 43 cases with accuracy above 90%, compared to 32 cases when using 
large ranges. The small ranges of frequency provide more features for comparison, thus 
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details for each participant. Each point in Figure 37 represents the number of participants 
achieved the corresponding accuracy. 
Furthermore, Figure 36 shows a comparison of the normalized and un-normalized frame 
with small frequency ranges. Using the un-normalized feature-frame, the classifier detected 
only 23 cases with accuracy above 90%, which is the worst result compared to the rest of 
the feature-frames. The normalization reduced the impact of EEG signal variability and 
increased the ability of the proposed approach to distinguish between normal and malicious 
activities [153]. This result demonstrates the effect of normalizing the extracted features. 
In contrast, the proposed EEG approach significantly outperformed in this comparison.   
 































Figure 37: Accuracy Comparison of Feature-frames using Scatter Chart 
To illustrate the changes in the smaller EEG frequency bands during normal and malicious 
acts, Figure 38 shows the lower and higher values of every frequency range. Each value 
represents the median of all participants for the range. For example, the lower value of 
delta is the median of the lower delta values of all participants. The changes are the result 
of changing the concentration of each EEG wave during different scenarios. Also, using 
smaller ranges highlights the differences more clearly. 
Furthermore, to demonstrate that the extracted EEG features have much better performance 
than the raw EEG waves (i.e., frame d in Figure 30), Figure 39 illustrates the comparison 
of the two methods’ accuracy. This comparison shows the number of participants for whom 
a classifier could correctly detect that they engaged in malicious activities and 
demonstrates the accuracy of this detection. The figure illustrates that when using the 
proposed EEG features, the classifier can correctly detect insider threats more than two 
times better than when using the raw brainwaves: Using the proposed EEG features, the 
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raw EEG waves. Moreover, unlike the raw EEG waves, the proposed EEG features 
achieved fewer cases within the smaller accuracy ranges. Furthermore, Figure 40 provides 
more details about the comparison between the proposed EEG features and the raw 
brainwaves by illustrating the accuracy of individual participant in a scatter chart. 
 
Figure 38: EEG Frequency Bands During Normal and Malicious Acts 
 
Figure 39: Accuracy of The Proposed EEG And Raw EEG Data Using RF  
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Figure 40: Scatter Chart of Accuracy for The Proposed EEG and Raw EEG 
6.6.1 Rejection of Null Hypothesis H0-1 
To reject the first null hypothesis H0-1, the proposed EEG features must increase the 
detection values of malicious activities more than using the raw brainwaves. To 
demonstrate this, the Z-score test (equation 6.1) is used as following: 
?̅?: The average of difference = 15.11.  𝑆: Standard Deviation = 12.28 
𝑛: Sample Number = 84. 𝛼: Significance Value =1%. The t state 𝑡0 = 11.28  
The t Critical one-tail (cutoff point) is 2.372. In right-tail hypothesis testing, any 𝑡0 greater 
than the critical value will be used to reject H0-1. Since t state =11.28 which is greater than 
2.372, we reject the first null hypothesis H0-1 and developed an alternative hypothesis, 
which we will refer to as H1-1.  
H1-1) The extracted features from the brainwaves (EEG signals) have a positive effect on 


















6.7 Results of EEG+ECG Features 
This section aims to validate the second research hypothesis H0-2 and illustrate the 
potential improvement of using the ECG features for identifying insider threats. To achieve 
this end, the classification results of the extracted EEG+ECG features will be presented, 
then the EEG+ECG accuracy is compared with only the accuracy of the EEG features. The 
improvement in the EEG+ECG accuracy over the EEG-only features illustrates the effect 
of using ECG on detecting insider threats. 
Figure 41 shows that when using EEG+ECG features, the classifier can distinguish 
between normal and malicious activities in 81 cases with an accuracy of more than 90%, 
compared with 67 cases when using only the EEG features. The number of cases in which 
the classifier was confident that the participant was doing malicious work increased when 
using EEG+ECG. This improvement demonstrates the effect of adding the extracted ECG 
features to the proposed EEG frame. Moreover, Figure 42 provides more details using the 
scatter chart. 
 





















Figure 42: Scatter Chart of Participant' Accuracy using EEG+ECG and EEG features 
Percent difference (PD) is usually used when comparing two experimental results when 
the results have been obtained using two different approaches. Table 11 illustrates the PD 
of EEG and EEG+ECG accuracy. With accuracy of more than 90%, cases detected using 
the EEG+ECG method increased by around 18.9% over EEG only. When the classifier is 
confident with more than 90%, the classifier can detect 81 participants using EEG+ECG 
compared with 67 participants when using only EEG features. Using EEG+ECG signals 
increases the variation between normal and malicious signals. Thus, it can achieve better 
results when detecting insider threats than EEG can. 
Table 11: PD of Accuracy Ranges 
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6.7.1 Rejection of Null Hypothesis H0-2 
The results of the proposed EEG+ECG approach illustrate that the ECG features had a 
positive impact on detecting insider threats, by increasing the variation between normal 
and suspicious activities. Adding ECG features to the EEG feature-frame leads to accuracy 
improvement of the proposed system. To test H0-2, the Z-score test (equation 6.1) is used. 
?̅?: The average of difference = 3.623  𝑆: Standard Deviation = 5.85 
𝑛: Sample Number = 84. 𝛼: Significance Value =1%. The t state 𝑡0 = 5.67  
The critical value (cutoff point) is 2.372. The t state of 5.67 is in the rejection area. We 
reject the second null hypothesis H0-2 and develop an alternative research hypothesis 
which we will refer to as H1-2. 
H1-2) The extracted features from the electrocardiogram (ECG) signals have a positive 
effect on detecting an insider attacker, by differentiating between normal and suspicious 
activities. 
6.8 Classification Accuracy Assessments 
Given that the accuracy metric has limitations when used with unbalanced data (i.e., 
usually, the number of normal frames is greater than the number of malicious frames) 
[152], we justified the results using six additional metrics illustrated in Figure 43. These 
metrics are effective with data sets containing highly unbalanced classes. For instance, the 
area under the curve, and Matthews correlation coefficients that are widely used in the 
biomedical research and selected in the US FDA-led initiative MAQC-II as one of the 
elective metrics [174]. Figure 43 shows the evaluation of the proposed EEG and 
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EEG+ECG approaches when using the RF classifier. It can be noticed that both approaches 
achieved high results within the range of 90–100%, which proves the accuracy and quality 
of the extracted features to detect insider attacks. 
Precision represents the ratio of the true number of malicious frames detected by the 
classifier to the total frames that were predicted as malicious. Figure 43.a shows that when 
using the proposed EEG+ECG features, the RF classifier can correctly detect 80 cases with 
precision range above 90%. This result indicates that the proposed system is accurate for 
detecting malicious threats, and the change in the detection accuracy will not exceed 10% 
when the test is repeated several times. On the other hand, within the same precision range, 
the classifier can correctly detect 66 cases using proposed EEG features. This high level of 
precision value illustrates that the classification accuracy of the proposed features is stable 
and is not achieved randomly. 
Recall demonstrates the ratio of the number of malicious frames detected to the total 
number of true malicious frames for a participant. Figure 43.b illustrates that the proposed 
EEG+ECG detected 79 cases with recall range above 90%. This result demonstrates the 
number of true positives (malicious frames) that the RF classifier can detect from the 
participant data. In other words, the classifier can predict correctly 90–100% of the total 
suspicious signals for 79 participants. Conversely, using EEG features, 63 cases were 
detected with recall range above 90%. 
Matthews’s correlation coefficient (MCC) returns coefficients in the range of -1 to 1. 
Regardless of the size of unbalanced data, the higher the coefficients are, the better the 
classifier's prediction is. From Figure 43.c, both EEG and EEG+ECG methods achieved 
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positive MCC values much higher than -1. Using EEG+ECG, the classifier detected 75 
cases with MCC above 90%. 
The area under the curve (AUC) demonstrates how good the classifier is to distinguish 
between normal and malicious activities. The high value of AUC proves that the FP rate 
(i.e., detected malicious data) is much more than the FP rate (i.e., normal data identified as 
malicious). From Figure 43.d, when using the EEG+ECG approach, the classifier can 
detect all the cases within the AUC range above 90%. This result proves the quality of the 
extracted features which reduce the number of normal frames that are detected as 
suspicious. In contrast, using the proposed EEG approach, RF classifier detects 74 cases 
with AUC above 90%, which is considered a high result. 
F-score is a single measure which represents the harmonic mean for recall and precision. 
F-score is utilized to assess the usefulness of the classification technique. The higher the 
F-score, the better the prediction of the classifier. Figure 43.e shows that when using the 
EEG+ECG approach, the classifier detected 80 cases with F-score above 90%. This result 
shows the predictive power of the classifier due to the advantages of the proposed features. 
Moreover, within the F-score range above 90%, the classifier detected 67 cases using the 
proposed EEG method. 
Kappa evaluates the performance of the classifier compared with the possibility of 
achieving this performance through random chance. The higher the Kappa value, the more 
accurate the classifier is. Figure 43.f illustrates that when using both the EEG+ECG and 
EEG methods, the classifier detects most of the cases with kappa range above 90%. 
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To summarize this section, the proposed approaches (EEG+ECG and EEG) achieved high 
results within the range of 90–100%, which proves the quality of the extracted features to 
detect the insider threats and supports the accuracy metric. 
      
  5.a 5.b 
  5.c 5.d 
  5.e 5.f 
Figure 43: (a,b,c,d,e,f): Evaluating the Results using Several Metrics 
6.9 Evaluation Using Three Classifiers 
Since classification is a crucial phase for distinguishing between insider threats and normal 
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results of the proposed approach: the random forest (RF) [158], support vector machine 
(SVM) [160], and back propagation neural network (NN) [162]. Each algorithm has its 
model and learning method, discussed earlier in Chapter 5. This section illustrates the effect 
of these classifiers on the results of the proposed EEG and EEG+ECG methods. 
Table 12 compares the proposed approach with the raw brainwaves. The table summarize 
the results of the eighty four participants that are shown in Figure 40 and Figure 42 by 
illustrating the average accuracy, the confidence interval (C.I.), false positive rate (FPR)  
and false negative rate (FNR). The table illustrates the comparison using three classifiers 
which are RF, SVM and NN. The table illustrates the improvement of the proposed 
approach for detecting internal threats.   
Table 12: Comparing Approaches using Confidence Interval, FPR and FNR 
Classifier Random Forest Support Vector Machine Neural Network 
Measure 
Accuracy ± 
95% C. I. 
FPR FNR 
Accuracy ± 
95% C. I. 
FPR FNR 
Accuracy ± 
95% C. I. 
FPR FNR 
          Raw BW 79.69 ± 2.74 13.5% 31.4% 75.51 ± 2.3 10.3% 48.6% 77.9 ± 2.72 13.5% 36.1% 
EEG 94.8 ± 1.49 3.9% 7% 95 ± 1.6 3.4% 7.1% 95.33 ± 1.71 3.8% 4.2% 
EEG+ECG 98.42 ± 0.62 1.1% 2.3% 98.26± 0.77 1.3% 2.4% 98.3± 0.82 1.4% 2.1% 
Table 13 illustrates the performance of the proposed approaches using different classifiers 
and several evaluation metrics. Although the three classifiers achieved high average 
accuracy in identifying the insider threats when using the proposed EEG+ECG features, 
the random forest (RF) slightly outperformed, with an average accuracy up to 98.42%. The 
very close results of the three classifiers when using EEG+ECG indicate the quality of the 
extracted features that allow the three classifiers to identify the malicious activities with 
high accuracy. On the other hand, when using the EEG features, the back propagation 
neural network (NN) achieved an average accuracy of 95.33%. Moreover, the table 
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clarifies the improvement in the results when using the extracted EEG features over those 
when using the raw brainwaves. 
Table 13: Comparison of EEG+ECG with EEG Approach and the Raw Brainwaves 
Classifier Random Forest Support Vector Machine Neural Network 









          Accuracy 98.42 94.80 79.69 98.26 95.01 75.51 98.30 95.33 77.90 
Precision 0.98 0.94 0.76 0.98 0.95 0.76 0.98 0.95 0.74 
Recall 0.98 0.93 0.69 0.98 0.93 0.51 0.98 0.94 0.64 
AUC 1.00 0.97 0.84 0.98 0.95 0.71 0.99 0.97 0.81 
F-measure 0.98 0.94 0.72 0.98 0.94 0.57 0.98 0.94 0.67 
Kappa 0.97 0.89 0.56 0.96 0.90 0.43 0.97 0.90 0.51 
MCC 0.97 0.89 0.56 0.96 0.90 0.46 0.97 0.90 0.52 
Furthermore, Table 14 shows that, for the three classifiers, the results of detecting insider 
threats from females are better than the results for males when using the extracted EEG 
features. This can be attributed to the fact that females report more levels of fear and 
anxiety than males due to different factors, including biological and cultural influences 
[179, 180]. On the other hand, the accuracy gap between males and females diminished 
when using the EEG+ECG features; this can be attributed to that the addition of the ECG 
features increases the distinction between the normal and suspicious activities in both 
genders, thus diminishing the gap between the results. 
Table 14: Comparing EEG+ECG with the Extracted EEG Based on Gender 
Measure 
Classifier 
Random Forest Support Vector Machine Neural Network 
EEG+ECG EEG EEG+ECG EEG EEG+ECG EEG 
M F M F M F M F M F M F 
             
Accuracy 98.17 98.68 92.68 97.01 98.05 98.47 92.67 97.46 98.21 98.39 92.90 97.87 
Precision 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.97 
Recall 0.97 0.98 0.90 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.89 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.97 
AUC 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.99 
F-measure 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.97 
Kappa 0.96 0.97 0.85 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.85 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.85 0.96 
MCC 0.96 0.97 0.85 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.85 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.85 0.96 
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Figure 44 illustrates the classification accuracy of EEG+ECG features using three 
classifiers, i.e., RF, SVM, and NN. The RF classifier detects 81 cases with accuracy above 
90%, which shows some improvement over SVM and NN. The SVM and NN classifiers 
correctly classified 80 and 79 cases with accuracy range above 90%, respectively. To 
simplify the comparison and discuss the classification results further, the percent difference 
PD is calculated as illustrated in Table 15. 
Table 15 shows a comparison between the classifiers using the PD and a threshold level of 
85%. The threshold level was selected to illustrate the accuracy of the three classifiers 
above this level. We can notice that when accuracy is above 85%, the RF classifier 
outperforms the remaining classifiers with around 1.2%, whereas the NN and SVM 
achieved the same number of detected cases. On the other hand, when accuracy is below 
the threshold level, the RF achieved accuracy 66.7% lower than the NN and SVM 
classifiers, where the RF detected one case compared with two cases identified by the other 
classifiers. Despite the small value of PD, the results of the three classifiers are almost the 
same. 
 
Figure 44: Accuracy of proposed EEG+ECG method using three classifiers 
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Table 15: PD of The Classifiers' Accuracy Using EEG Features 
Accuracy 
Ranges in % 
Volunteers Percent Difference (PD) 
RF SVM NN RF&SVM RF&NN SVM&NN 






]80 - 85] 1 2 1 66.7% 0% 66.7% 





0% [90 - 95] 5 5 4 0% 22.2% 22.2% 
[95 - 100] 76 75 75 1.3% 1.3% 0% 
 
Figure 45 demonstrates the influences of the classification algorithms on the results of EEG 
features. When accuracy is above 90%, the RF and SVM classifiers detect 67 cases 
compared to 66 cases detected by the NN classifier. Moreover, the three classifiers detected 
eleven cases within the accuracy range of 80–90%. The figure demonstrates that the 
classifiers achieved approximately the same accuracy, which proves the quality of 
proposed EEG features is not affected by the learning algorithms of the classifiers. 
 
Figure 45: Accuracy of proposed EEG method using three classifiers 
Furthermore, Table 16 illustrates the impact of classification algorithms on the EEG 
features. The table shows that when the 85% threshold level is used, RF and NN detected 
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the same number of cases. Thus, they do not have any PD. In contrast, SVM achieved 1.4% 
higher results within the accuracy range above 85%. 
Table 16: PD of Classifiers's Accuracy Using EEG+ECG 
Accuracy 
Ranges in % 
Volunteers Percent Difference (PD) 
RF SVM NN RF&SVM RF&NN SVM&NN 





8.7% [75 - 80] 5 4 3 22.2% 50% 13.3% 
[80 - 85] 6 5 5 18.2% 18.2% 0% 





1.4% [90 - 95] 8 11 5 31.6% 46.2% 75% 
[95 - 100] 59 56 61 5.2% 3.3% 8.6% 
6.10 Evaluation Using a Group of Frames 
Using an average of five frames certainly reduces the data processing time compared to 
analyzing each frame of incoming data. However, the accuracy of the proposed EEG+ECG 
could be affected by compressing the data. To illustrate the effect of using a group of five 
frames on detecting malicious attacks, a comparison between the accuracy of the whole set 
of incoming data (1F) and the accuracy of a group of five frames was conducted, as shown 
in Figure 46. The comparison includes the average (AVG), median, and standard deviation 
(STD) of a group of five frames. From the figure, we can notice that, when accuracy is 
above 95%, the RF classifier classifies the data of only 18 volunteers using the standard 
deviation, which is very far from the classification results when using one frame 
(EEG+ECG) or the average and the median of five frames. However, using 1F, the 
classifier correctly classifies the data of 74 volunteers, with an accuracy above 95%. In the 
same range, the classification results of the average and the median of five frames are 75 
and 76 volunteers, respectively. 
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The average and the median of a group of five frames do not significantly affect the 
accuracy of detecting malicious activities, which indicates the quality of extracted 
EEG+ECG features. The proposed EEG+ECG approach succeeded to differentiate 
between normal and malicious activities, and it divided the related signals of each activity 
into a separate group of similar signals. So, the average and the median of the similar five 
frames provide approximate value to the values in the five frames. On the contrary, the 
standard deviation of each five frames increased the dispersion of values and decreased the 
accuracy of detecting malicious activities. 
 
Figure 46: Comparing EEG+ECG Accuracy of AVG, Median, and STD 
6.11 Evaluation Using Varied Amount of Malicious Data 
It is very important that the proposed approach recognizes the malicious data, even if the 
amount of the incoming data is too small. Figure 47 shows the comparison of the learning 
curves of the three classification models using the error rates while varying the amount of 
incoming data. The figure illustrates the error rate for the classifiers while feeding the 
classifiers with 10% less data at a time. As illustrated from the figure, the NN classifier 
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with the proposed EEG approach can correctly detect the malicious activities with an error 
rate around 8% when using only 10% of the incoming data. On the other hand, the NN 
classifier has an error rate around 24.7% with the raw EEG data. Moreover, Figure 47 
shows that when the incoming data are too small, the results of the proposed EEG approach 
using NN classifier are much better than RF and SVM classifiers. On the other hand, the 
results of the RF classifier outperformed the other classifiers when using the raw EEG data. 
 
Figure 47: Percent incorrect with Different Size of Data 
Figure 48 illustrates that the NN classifier with the proposed EEG+ECG features can 
correctly detect malicious activities with an error rate around 4.5% when using only 10% 
of the incoming data. On the other hand, the NN classifier has an error rate around 8% 
when using the proposed EEG features. Moreover, the figure illustrates that, when using 
less than 20% of the incoming data, the accuracy of the SVM classifier becomes the worst 
compared to the results of NN and RF classifiers. When using less than 15% of the 
incoming data, the NN classifier with the proposed EEG features achieved a lower error 
rate than the SVM classifier with the proposed EEG+ECG features. SVM achieved the 

























class while building the model, especially when dealing with unbalanced data [104, 105]. 
This drawback of the SVM classifier appears clearly in the proposed approach only when 
we use less than 20% of the incoming data. Therefore, the SVM classifier is not 
recommended when there is too little data. 
 
Figure 48: Incorrect Data of the Proposed EEG+ECG and the EEG Only  
Time is an important factor in evaluating the performance of machine learning classifiers. 
The elapsed time to build a machine learning model for each classifier, known as the 
training time, varies. To show the elapsed training time versus the achieved results, the 
ROC curves and the average training time were drawn. The average training time is the 
time needed to build the model per person. Therefore, in this research, the total time per 
second to build the model for the classifier is the average training time multiplied by 84, 
which is the number of cases in our experiments. 
Figures 49, 50, and 51 illustrate the average training time versus the ROC curves for each 
classifier when the classifiers are fed with 10% less data at a time. From the figures, using 




























models. Additionally, the problem with the SVM results when there is 20% less incoming 
data affects the results of the SVM classifier when a group of five frames is used, but it 
does not affect the one-frame results (1F) of the EEG+ECG, as illustrated in Figure 50. 
 
Figure 49: ROC Curves and the Training Time per Second Using RF 
Moreover, there is no direct correlation between the results obtained and the training time. 
The average training time of the NN classifier is around 10 times more than that of the RF 
and the SVM classifiers. However, the ROC curve achieved by the NN classifier is slightly 
less than the ROC curve of the RF classifier, as illustrated in Figure 49 and Figure 51. 
Furthermore, although the standard deviation of a group of five frames (5F STD) achieved 
the worst accuracy results, it did not achieve the shortest training time: The average and 
median of five frames (5F AVG and 5F Median) achieved better results with an average 
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Figure 50: ROC Curves and the Training Time per Second Using SVM 
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6.12 Evaluation for New Incoming Data 
To evaluate the proposed features for the new incoming data, we tested the approach as a 
unit for the whole population. Two types of evaluation were used including 10 folds cross-
validation of the whole participants' data and 70% Training – 30% Testing of the data. 
Moreover, to assess the detection quality when the number of frames is changed, the test 
includes the utilization of a different number of frames, where each session's frames were 
compressed as discussed in Section 6.5. 
Table 17 illustrates the results of the proposed EEG+ECG approach that calculated over 
the whole population per session when each participant's session consists of whole frames 
(1 Frame), a group of (5, 10 and 15) Frames. The table shows the false positive (FP) and 
false negative (FN) rates, and the accuracy. From the table, we can notice that the proposed 
approach has no major difference in the accuracy when the number of frames is changed. 
 
Table 17: Confidence Intervale, FP and FN Rates of Proposed EEG+ECG Approach 
Frames 
10 Folds Cross-Validation 70% Training, 30% Testing 
FNR FPR Accuracy ± CI FNR FPR Accuracy ± CI 
1 Frame 4% 11% 93.38 ± 0.21 6.4% 14.4% 90.59 ± 0.14 
5 Frames 10% 21% 85.75 ± 0.27 11.5% 22.5% 84.45 ± 0.18 
10 Frames 9% 17.4% 87.88 ± 0.38 10.2% 21.4% 85.6 ± 0.34 
15 Frames 7.7% 18.6% 88.26 ± 0.44 10.7% 19.6% 86 ± 0.40 
 
Moreover, we evaluated the proposed features for the whole population per participants, 
using 10 folds cross-validation and 70% Training – 30% Testing of participants. In the 
cross-validation the participants were divided into 10 groups one of the groups used as a 
test whereas the other 9 groups used for training the model. The test repeated 10 times then 
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the average of the results is calculated. On the other test, the 70% of the participants used 
as Training – and 30% used as Testing. The test repeated 10 times where the 30% of 
participants in the testing selected randomly from the populations. Table 18 shows the 
results of the evaluation. 
Table 18: Results of EEG+ECG Approach for the Whole Population per Participant 
Folds 
10 Folds Cross-Validation 70% Training, 30% Testing 
FNR FPR Accuracy FNR FPR Accuracy 
1 22% 5% 87.87 24% 12% 83.0 
2 21% 8% 86.37 22% 16% 81.10 
3 19% 10% 86.04 31% 4% 85.74 
4 35% 1% 85.91 24% 9% 84.93 
5 17% 7% 88.60 26% 11% 83 
6 18% 11% 85.75 30% 7% 84.4 
7 31% 2% 87.87 26% 11% 82.82 
8 15% 8% 88.91 23% 6% 87.1 
9 23% 2% 90.46 20% 12% 84.6 
10 16% 7% 89.40 36% 7% 82.12 
Avg 22% 6% 87.72 26% 10% 83.88 
Furthermore, to further evaluate the proposed approach for new incoming data, the 
approach evaluated for participant separately. To achieve this goal, only one participant is 
used as testing data whereas the others 83 participants used for training the model. Figure 
52 illustrates the accuracy of each participant. The X axis illustrates the accuracy value 
whereas the Y axis illustrates the number of participants achieved this value. Moreover, 
Table 19 shows the average accuracy, FPR and FNR of the 84 participants where the 
detailed results of each participant is illustrated in Appendix B. 
Table 19: Average Accuracy, FPR and FNR of the 84 Participants 
Features FNR FPR Accuracy 95% C.I. 
EEG+ECG 19.7% 4.6% 90% 90 ± 1.26 
EEG 19.3% 11.8% 85.6% 85.6 ± 2.27 





Figure 52: Accuracy per participant 
To evaluate the efficacy of the proposed approach based on gender, Table 20 shows the 
average of accuracy, FPR and FNR for the males and the females. Where this average is 
calculated from the test of evaluated each participant separately (1 person test, 83 persons 
Train). From the table, we can notice that the results of detecting insider threats from 
females are better than the results for males when using the extracted EEG features. This 
can be attributed to the fact that females report more levels of fear and anxiety than males 
due to different factors, including biological and cultural influences [179, 180]. Moreover, 
this fact can be noticed when using a raw brainwaves. In contrast, when using the 
EEG+ECG features, the accuracy gap between genders diminished; this can be attributed 
to that the addition of the ECG features increases the distinction between the normal and 





















Table 20: Comparing Approaches Based on Gender 
Method 
EEG+ECG EEG Brainwaves 
Males Females Males Females Males Females 
FPR 7.7% 1.4% 18% 4% 8% 14.3% 
FNR 15% 23% 19% 19% 57% 68% 
Accuracy 89.44 90.57 80.92 90.5 72.89% 66.7% 
95% C.I. 89.44±1.7 90.57±1.8 80.92±3.3 90.5±2.3 72.89±2.65 66.7±2.7 
 
6.13 Evaluating proposed method with Suh and Yim approach 
To assess the performance of the proposed approach, we compared our approach with Suh 
and Yim approach [109] utilizing our dataset. Suh and Yim used a quantitative EEG 
analysis to develop two types of indicators which are the relative power of (alpha, beta, 
theta, the sum of alpha and theta, and gamma waves) and the ratio of brainwave-to-
brainwave (i.e., gamma/alpha and beta/alpha). Figure 53 shows the feature frame of Suh 
and Yim approach. 
 







Figure 53: Feature Frame of Suh ans Yim Approach 
 
Figure 54 and Figure 55 illustrate the comparison of the proposed approach with Suh’s 
method using RF classifier. The comparison includes two techniques of classification 
which are the 10 folds cross-validation and 70% of the data for the training. From the 
figures, we can notice that the proposed EEG only and EEG+ECG features achieved better 
results than Suh’s method in detecting insider threats. This can be attributed to the proposed 
feature-factors which are dividing the EEG waves into smaller ranges, Normalization and 
extract additional features from the influential EEG waves. Moreover, Figure 55 illustrates 
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that the proposed approach achieved better computation training time than Suh’s method, 
this can be attributed to the small values resulting from normalizing of extracted features 
compared to the un-normalized data in Suh's method.   
 









Evaluating the proposed system is the final stage of the methodology of this research. To 
evaluate the proposed system, two null hypotheses were developed. Each hypothesis 
addressed the potential effect for a type of the bio-signals on distinguishing between the 
malicious and non-malicious activities. In this chapter, the null hypotheses have been 
rejected based on the accuracy of the classification results. Although the accuracy may give 
unreliable results when used with unbalanced classes of data, additional more reliable 
metrics were used to assess the correctness of the accuracy metric including precision, 
recall, area under the ROC curve, kappa, F-score, and Matthews correlation coefficients. 
The classification results illustrate the ability of the proposed system to differentiate 
between malicious and normal activities with a considerable accuracy. The results show 
that the proposed approach can detect insider threats with an average accuracy up to 98.4%, 
which negates the validity of the null hypotheses and demonstrates the positive effect of 
the extracted features on detecting the insider threats. 
Moreover, since the classification is a crucial phase in the proposed system, three 
classification algorithms were used to test and assess their influence on the results. The 
results illustrated that there is an insignificant difference between the accuracy of these 
classification algorithms in detecting the insider threats. Furthermore, the system has been 
evaluated when using a group of frames. Using a group of 5 frames showed some 




7 CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
This research studies the feasibility of detecting insider threats by distinguishing between 
normal and malicious activities utilizing human bio-signals. Although the results of the 
proposed system are promising and worthy of future research, this research has some 
limitations which should be illustrated. This chapter concludes the dissertation, discusses 
the limitations and demonstrates the future research directions. 
7.1 Conclusion 
Insider threats are a considerable risk to organizations, more than external hackers, because 
insiders have more knowledge than outsiders do about the organization's system and its 
security mechanisms. Insiders are employees and trusted partners who have authorized 
access to the information and digital systems of the organization. Moreover, some insiders 
carefully plan out their intentions and deliberately take steps to put themselves in the best 
position to carry out these attacks. Therefore, the discovery of insider attacks is not easy, 
since it is hard to differentiate between these crimes and non-malicious activities. 
Insider attacks cause extensive damage to organizations. Thinking about the added cost of 
the data breach, that is even more disconcerting and brings a bigger financial burden to an 
organization. The added costs come from a variety of sources: it is not just the financial 
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loss of that information, but it is everything from the cost of responding to that incident, to 
cleaning all damages, and installing preventative systems. There are also many tangible 
costs such as the loss of customer loyalty. Therefore, governments and organizations invest 
money and enact laws for mitigating the risk of such attacks. 
This research aims to mitigate the risk of insider threats by proposing an insider attack 
detection system using human involuntary bio-signals. Human bio-signals are spontaneous 
signals done without will or self-control. Thus they are hard to imitate. Unfortunately, no 
available data set contains the bio-signals collected during malicious and normal activities 
of insiders, to the best of our knowledge. Therefore, this research provides a data set that 
contains sufficient samples of human bio-signals collected during real suspicious activities. 
To this end, two experiments were conducted to collect such signals. These experiments 
were based on two scenarios: normal and malicious activities. 
In the first scenario, the human bio-signals were collected from participants while 
conducting normal work activities such as writing or thinking for solving problems. On the 
other hand, the second scenario was developed based on physiological rules, which state 
that intervention in decision-making and the sense of responsibility play an important role 
in influencing human bio-signals. So, in the second scenario, the appropriate environment 
and motivators have been provided for the participants to conduct malicious activities, 
leaving the decision-making to the participants to conduct such activities. 
The bio-signals were assembled into a data set which is divided into two parts: normal 
activities and suspicious activities. Each part of the data set contains two types of bio-
signals, which are: the electroencephalogram (EEG) and the electrocardiogram (ECG). In 
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order to support this search area, the data set was created to be public for conducting further 
researches. 
To detect the insider threats using human bio-signals, thirteen features have been extracted 
from the collected EEG and ECG signals. These features represent the measurable 
characteristics of the bio-signals that can be used to distinguish between the normal and 
malicious behaviors. 
Furthermore, an insider threat detection system was proposed in this study. The proposed 
system consists of eight units, which are: EEG sensors, ECG sensors, EEG interface, ECG 
interface, a feature extractor, attack assessment, comparative signals data set and attack 
evaluator. These units represent the different stages starting from the collecting of bio-
signals to the stage of determining the attack. With the rapidity of technological 
advancement, new wearable techniques are developed to collect and analyze human bio-
signals. It is worth mentioning that this research did not put any restriction on sensor type; 
any types of sensor could be used as long as they can collect bio-signals accurately and do 
not obstruct the employees' work. 
The results show that the proposed EEG+ECG approach can detect insider threats with an 
average accuracy up to 98.4% when building a machine learning model for each 
participant, which means that less than 2% of all the incoming malicious signals were 
misclassified. Thus, classifiers can detect the insider threats even if the incoming data is 
too small. Furthermore, since the accuracy can be influenced by the small size of the 
malicious data class, the correctness of accuracy metric has been verified using several 
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reliable metrics. All in all, the results illustrate that the proposed system is effective for 
detecting insider threats. 
Furthermore, we have tested the proposed EEG+ECG approach for new incoming data 
using several methods. When testing the whole data of participant using 10 folds cross-
validation and 70% of the data for training, the proposed EEG+ECG achieved accuracy of 
93.38%, and 90.59% respectively. Moreover, the proposed EEG+ECG approach has been 
tested for each participant individually by using the data for a single participant for testing 
whereas the data for the rest of 83 participants has been used for training the machine 
leaning, the EEG+ECG features achieved an average accuracy of 90%. 
In closing, this research study makes some contributions: developing an insider threat 
detection system that can accurately identify malicious activities, which will help 
organizations to detect insider attackers and to take the necessary actions to mitigate the 
risk of such attacks. Regardless of the insider attack mechanisms, the proposed system uses 
involuntary signals to detect such attacks. Also, this research work provides a data set 
which contains the physiological signals for 84 volunteers. The availability of the human 
physiological data set collected during normal and malicious activities for research use 





The results of this research study are promising and worthy of further research. However, 
this research has some limitations to be discussed. The following subsections clarify these 
limitations. 
7.2.1 Sensors 
Although the sensors used in this research to collect bio-signals have many features such 
as the small size, wearable, easy to connect to the computer, comfortable, cheap, and have 
been used in several types of research [131–133], but there are several devices that are 
more accurate and contain many sensors such as the 32-channel Biosemi headset [181], the 
64-channel g.Nautilus [182], and the 14-channel Emotiv EPOC [100]. Using these devices 
to collect human bio-signals, more signals can be assembled with additional details about 
the signals collected, thereby enriching the data set and ensuring the reliability of the 
results. A useful comparison between several EEG devices was conducted by Nijboer et 
al. [183].  
Furthermore, the devices used in this research to collect EEG and ECG signals are 
developed by different vendors. This led to the use of different interfaces to handle the 
collected bio-signals, which further complicated the analysis and storage of data in the data 
set. Utilizing devices created by the same company would facilitate the collection and 
analysis of the bio-signals. An example of a company that provides different devices for 
collecting human bio-signals is g.tec medical engineering [184]. 
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7.2.2 Number of Used Devices 
In this research, only four devices were used to collect human bio-signals due to the limited 
funds. These are two devices for collecting EEG signals and two for ECG signals. In each 
experiment session, only two participants use the devices. However, in the second scenario, 
one of the participants is a true participant, as we discussed in Chapter 5. So, the bio-signals 
of only one participant were collected each time. The nature of the second scenario 
(suspicious activities) requires that the procedures of this scenario be confidential, so this 
scenario should be carried out during a short period. However, due to the limited number 
of devices, conducting this scenario took a longer time. 
7.2.3 Hardware Limitations 
The EEG signals were collected using the NeuroSky device that runs on battery power and 
transmits the signals to the computer via Bluetooth. Such devices have lower data 
transmission range to minimize power consumption and called Class 2 Bluetooth devices 
[185]. Due to the range limitations, some EEG files in our data set contain very few bad 
signals which are not recorded in the file. In most cases, the bad signals between 
consecutive samples were five seconds at most and were symbolized in the file as NA (not 
available). 
7.2.4 Unused Bio-signals 
This research focuses on using EEG and ECG signals to detect insider threats. It is worthy 
of mention that the skin conductance level was also assembled and stored in the data set to 
be used for further research. Moreover, the NeuroSky device which was utilized for 
collecting EEG signals produces additional data. These data are the meditation level, 
attention level, and eye blink. But the device's company did not reveal the algorithms that 
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have been used to produce these data. Therefore, these data were considered informal 
signals. These data were collected and not used or stored in the formal data set but will be 
available upon request. 
7.2.5 Environment of collecting Data 
The experiments were conducted in the academic environment and the bio-signals were 
collected from university students and staffs. However, more bio-signals needs to be 
collected from industry environment to assess the implications of our research in the 
different environments. 
7.2.6 Final Product Deployment   
Since the major aim of this research to propose a new approach to detect insider threats, 
we extracted features and achieved the classification results by (the batch mode) using two 
different software MATLAB and Java + WEKA APIs. Because the mentioned software 
are reliable and have great facilities. However, deploying the final product of the proposed 




7.3 Future Research 
Providing the human physiological data set collected during normal and malicious 
activities for research purposes would provide an opportunity to develop and extend the 
research in this area. Although the results of the proposed system offer excellent potential 
for detecting insider threats, the proposed system has not utilized all the collected bio-
signals, because this study focused only on EEG and ECG signals. For instance, the skin 
conductivity level was collected during the experiments and stored in the bio-signals data 
set for further investigation. Moreover, the proposed system uses only three ECG features; 
more features can be extracted from the collected data, such as the heartbeat irregularity 
[186]. Further research is needed to refine the proposed system by extracting new features. 
Furthermore, using devices that have many sensors will provide more accurate results and 
offer additional details on the collected human bio-signals. The more details on the bio-
signals will provide additional features for detecting insider threats. Although the devices 
that have many sensors are expensive, we are planning to contact the vendors to denote the 
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Samples of Source Code 
 
MATLAB 
1. Get EEG data from Neurosky Device  
clear all 
clc 
filename = fullfile('Arabic.csv'); 
fileID = fopen(filename); 
C = textscan(fileID,'%f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f 
%f %f %s','Delimiter',';','TreatAsEmpty',{'NA','na'}, 
'CommentStyle','#'); 
fclose(fileID); 
obs=[C{1,1}];  %% Get the number of the signal 
t=[C{1,2}];  %% Read Time 








Attention=[C{1,11}];%% Get the value of Attention 
Meditation=[C{1,12}];%% Get the value of Meditation 
Blink=[C{1,13}]; %% Get the value of Blink  
Derived=[C{1,14}]; %% derived by the interface 
totPwr=[C{1,15}];  %% Get the total power 
class=[C{1,16}]; %% get the class added by the device 
train_dataA=[Delta,Theta,Alpha1,Alpha2,Beta1,Beta2,Gamma1,G
amma2,Attention,Meditation,Blink,Derived,totPwr]; 
train_dataA(:,14)=0; %% add 0 as class of the train data 
and 1 as class of test data 
 
2. Get ECG date from the Wild Divine Device 
clear all 
clc 
Root_directory='Path to the directory'; 
%Root_directory='D:\First part of test WildDivine'; 
%Read the Subdirectories 
sub_directories=dir(Root_directory); 
sa=1; % counter for samples 
sd=1; % counter for sdnn 
181 
 
pk=1; % counter for peak 
na=0; % counter for directories names 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  




     na=na+1; 
    sub_name{na}=sub_directories(sub_dir_index).name; 
    n=sub_name{na}; 
    % change any space in the filename with _ 
    h=''; 
    for f=1:length(n) 
        if(n(f)==' ') 
           h(f)='_'; 
        elseif (n(f)=='.') 
        break 
        else 
        h(f)=n(f); 
        end 
     end 
     display(h) 
     sub_name{na}=h; 
%Read the data from files      
     for j=3:length(csvs) 
      filename = fullfile(csvs(j,1).name); 
%Get The ECG Data  
          if  strcmp(filename,'sample.csv') 
s=strcat(Root_directory,'\',sub_directories(sub_d
ir_index).name,'\',csvs(j,1).name); 
          fileID = fopen(s); 
C = textscan(fileID,'%*f %*f %*f %*f %s %f 
%f','Delimiter',';','TreatAsEmpty',{'NA','na'},'C
ommentStyle','#'); 
          xsample{sa}=C; 
          sa=sa+1; 
          fclose(fileID);   
          end 
             
          if  strcmp(filename,'sdnn.csv') 
s=strcat(Root_directory,'\',sub_directories(sub_d
ir_index).name,'\',csvs(j,1).name); 
          fileID = fopen(s); 
Q = textscan(fileID,'%*f %*f %*f 
%f','Delimiter',';','TreatAsEmpty',{'NA','na'},'C
ommentStyle','#'); 
          xsdnn{sd}=Q; 
182 
 
          sd=sd+1; 
          fclose(fileID); 
          end 
             
          if  strcmp(filename,'peak.csv') 
s=strcat(Root_directory,'\',sub_directories(sub_d
ir_index).name,'\',csvs(j,1).name); 
          fileID = fopen(s); 
p= textscan(fileID,'%*f %*f %*f %s %f 
%f','Delimiter',';','TreatAsEmpty',{'NA','na'},'C
ommentStyle','#'); 
          xpeak{pk}=p; 
          pk=pk+1; 
          fclose(fileID); 
          end 
      end 
 end 












count=0; % count represents the number of train signals 





% Seperate the train from the test data for a person 
var=brain_waves_Nurosky{1,i};% var contains neurosky and WD 
(train and test )data for a single person 
var_nero=var;% var_nero contains the EEG+ECG signal 
(train+test) data with the class value 
    for j=1:length(var_nero) 
        if(var_nero(j,17)==0) 
        count=count+1; 
        end 






%% mean of train data 
    c=1; 
    for k=1:Frame_size:count- mod(count,Frame_size) 
        train_frame=var_nero_train(k:k+(Frame_size-1),:); 
        train_feature(c,:)=mean(train_frame); 
        c=c+1; 
    end 
    if(mod(count,Frame_size)~=0) 
    s1=floor(count/Frame_size)*Frame_size+1; 
        if(count-s1~=0) 
            train_last=mean(var_nero_train(s1:count,:)); 
            train_feature(c,:)=train_last; 
        end 
    end 
    train_feature(:,17)=0;    
%% mean of test data 
  c2=1; 
    for k=1:Frame_size:count_test- 
mod(count_test,Frame_size) 
        test_frame=var_nero_test(k:k+(Frame_size-1),:); 
        test_feature(c2,:)=mean(test_frame); 
        c2=c2+1; 
    end 
    if(mod(count_test,Frame_size)~=0) 
    s2=floor(count_test/Frame_size)*Frame_size+1; 
        if(count_test-s2 ~=0) 
            test_last=mean(var_nero_test(s2:count_test,:)); 
            test_feature(c2,:)=test_last; 
        end 
    end 
    test_feature(:,17)=1; 
     
%% merege train and test data then generate the arff file 
  
features=[train_feature;test_feature]; 
        sname=strcat(all_fname{1,i},'_5F_Brainwaves_mean'); 






JAVA with Weka API 

















public class Evaluation_CrossValidation2_CSV { 
  
 public static void main(String args[]) throws 
Exception{ 
  // set the path for the data set 
String path="path for the dataset"; 
  // Read the list of files from the folder 
  File folder = new File(path); 
  File[] listOfFiles = folder.listFiles(); 
  int no_of_files=0; 
     
    for (int i = 0; i < listOfFiles.length; i++)  
{ 
      if (listOfFiles[i].isFile())  
{ 
         no_of_files=no_of_files+1; 
System.out.println("File " + 
listOfFiles[i].getName()); 
  //load data sets 
DataSource source = new 
DataSource(path+ 
listOfFiles[i].getName()); 
    Instances dataset = 
source.getDataSet();  //set class index to the last 
attribute 
  dataset.setClassIndex(dataset.numAttributes()-1); 
  //create and build the classifier! 
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  Evaluation eval = new Evaluation(dataset); 
  Random rand = new Random(1); 
  int folds = 10; 
   
// the evaluation using Neural Network Classifier 
 MultilayerPerceptron nn = new MultilayerPerceptron(); 
 nn.buildClassifier(dataset); 
 eval.crossValidateModel(nn, dataset, folds, rand); 
 
// Evaluation using Random Forest Classifier 






 eval.evaluateModel(tree, testDataset); 
 eval.crossValidateModel(RF, dataset, folds, rand); 
   
// the evaluation using SVM Classifier 
 SMO svm = new SMO(); 
 Puk rbf = new Puk(); 
 svm.setKernel(rbf); 
 svm.buildClassifier(dataset); 
 eval.crossValidateModel(svm, dataset, folds, rand); 
 
// Print the evaluation results in a file 
try{ 
PrintWriter writer = new PrintWriter(new 
FileOutputStream(new File("destination path with file 
name"), true)); 
writer.append(listOfFiles[i].getName()+","); 
writer.append("Correct % =,"+eval.pctCorrect()+","); 
writer.append("Correct_NO =,"+eval.correct()+","); 
writer.append("Incorrect % =,"+eval.pctIncorrect()+","); 
writer.append("Incorrect NO =,"+eval.incorrect()+","); 
writer.append("AUC = ,"+eval.areaUnderROC(1)+","); 
writer.append("kappa = ,"+eval.kappa()+","); 
writer.append("MAE = ,"+eval.meanAbsoluteError()+","); 
writer.append("RMSE = ,"+eval.rootMeanSquaredError()+","); 
writer.append("RAE = ,"+eval.relativeAbsoluteError()+","); 
writer.append("RRSE = 
,"+eval.rootRelativeSquaredError()+","); 
writer.append("Precision = ,"+eval.precision(1)+","); 




writer.append("Error Rate =,"+eval.errorRate()+","); 






//the confusion matrix 
//writer.append(eval.toMatrixString("=== Overall Confusion 
Matrix ===\n")); 
writer.close(); 
  }  
catch (IOException e) { 
// do something 
  } 
  }  
























 * performs attribute selection using CfsSubsetEval and 
GreedyStepwise 
 * (backwards) and trains J48 with that. Needs 3.5.5 or 




 * @author FracPete (fracpete at waikato dot ac dot nz) 
 */ 
public class AttributeSelectionTest2 { 
 
/**uses the low level approach */ 
protected static void useLowLevel(Instances data, 
String   name) throws Exception { 
    System.out.println("\n3. Low-level"); 
    AttributeSelection attsel = new AttributeSelection(); 
    WrapperSubsetEval eval = new WrapperSubsetEval(); 
    //J48 base = new J48(); 
    SMO base = new SMO(); 
 Puk rbf = new Puk(); 
    base.setKernel(rbf); 
    //MultilayerPerceptron base = new 
MultilayerPerceptron(); 
    eval.setClassifier(base); 
    GreedyStepwise search = new GreedyStepwise(); 
    search.setSearchBackwards(false); 
    search.setThreshold(-1.7976931348623157E308); 
    attsel.setEvaluator(eval); 
    attsel.setSearch(search); 
    attsel.SelectAttributes(data); 
    int[] indices = attsel.selectedAttributes(); 
    for (int i = 0; i < indices.length; i++) { 
     int w=indices[i]; 
     w=w+1; 
     indices[i]=w; 
    } 
    System.out.println("selected attribute indices 
(starting with 0):\n" + Utils.arrayToString(indices)); 
    try{ 
  PrintWriter writer = new PrintWriter(new 






  writer.close(); 
    }  
catch (IOException e) { 
// do something 
 } 
  } 
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  public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { 
        
 // Load Dataset 
   
String path="Path to the dataset\\"; 
// Read the list of files from the folder 
File folder = new File(path); 
 File[] listOfFiles = folder.listFiles(); 
 int no_of_files=0; 
      
 for (int i = 0; i < listOfFiles.length; i++) { 
  if (listOfFiles[i].isFile()) { 
  no_of_files=no_of_files+1; 
System.out.println("File " + 
listOfFiles[i].getName()); 
  String name=listOfFiles[i].getName(); 
    
//Read Each File from the dataset path 
DataSource source = new DataSource(path+ 
listOfFiles[i].getName()); 
  Instances dataset = source.getDataSet();  
  //set class index to the last attribute 
  dataset.setClassIndex(dataset.numAttributes()-1); 
     
    useLowLevel(dataset,name); 
} 








Participant Accuracy FPR% FNR% Participant Accuracy FPR% FNR% 
1 95.22 0.00 12.21 43 89.13 8.61 14.83 
2 90.36 9.17 10.34 44 89.20 0.00 29.72 
3 90.48 8.48 11.30 45 95.06 0.00 13.04 
4 97.02 2.32 3.81 46 87.72 8.28 18.76 
5 76.81 0.12 64.42 47 95.62 1.91 8.43 
6 87.37 8.75 19.33 48 91.79 0.00 22.17 
7 87.96 0.00 19.69 49 90.70 0.00 27.51 
8 94.50 0.12 15.35 50 88.95 0.00 30.60 
9 90.51 10.55 7.64 51 94.35 0.00 20.30 
10 92.24 8.15 7.10 52 92.68 7.38 7.23 
11 93.87 0.00 17.28 53 83.07 0.00 55.96 
12 88.32 0.00 33.19 54 74.14 0.00 72.90 
13 85.63 0.00 40.60 55 99.91 0.00 0.32 
14 91.89 8.19 8.00 56 83.95 5.37 34.51 
15 80.67 12.82 26.26 57 86.72 0.00 34.10 
16 93.28 6.52 7.02 58 96.96 0.00 9.29 
17 92.15 11.72 1.56 59 87.77 0.00 33.40 
18 88.75 16.27 5.14 60 97.09 0.00 7.80 
19 92.08 0.00 20.86 61 86.70 12.23 14.73 
20 74.05 32.66 16.45 62 77.00 38.13 1.04 
21 90.89 4.51 19.20 63 94.29 7.87 1.98 
22 88.45 12.84 9.73 64 92.57 8.68 5.46 
23 95.76 0.00 11.76 65 99.57 0.12 1.35 
24 92.26 0.00 21.00 66 93.41 5.21 8.54 
25 82.12 0.00 49.58 67 92.71 0.23 21.15 
26 80.44 0.00 53.66 68 93.35 0.00 28.27 
27 91.04 9.36 8.41 69 84.97 0.00 42.60 
28 90.77 0.00 25.48 70 83.48 3.43 35.20 
29 89.96 0.36 28.98 71 90.03 0.00 27.93 
30 96.22 0.18 9.82 72 92.81 8.75 4.69 
31 87.56 0.00 34.39 73 90.46 10.22 8.53 
32 86.55 0.00 37.31 74 79.24 0.12 59.09 
33 88.07 0.00 34.00 75 89.34 10.65 10.69 
34 86.66 0.00 33.78 76 99.01 0.00 3.03 
35 89.97 10.51 9.23 77 92.82 5.96 9.29 
36 98.50 0.12 4.02 78 90.06 11.25 7.48 
37 98.91 0.12 2.72 79 95.04 1.25 9.63 
38 82.03 15.57 21.84 80 93.88 0.00 18.27 
39 87.06 20.74 3.00 81 82.64 0.00 50.23 
40 98.66 0.00 5.38 82 93.06 0.00 19.87 
41 97.81 0.00 5.87 83 96.94 0.00 12.59 
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